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WEALTH INEQUALITY AND FAMILY BUSINESSES 
Benjamin Means* 
ABSTRACT 
Wealth inequality endangers democratic values and calls for a public 
response. This Article contends that family businesses merit special scrutiny 
because they control vast amounts of private wealth and combine two of 
society’s most important economic institutions: family and business. 
Accordingly, family businesses implicate concerns regarding both inherited 
wealth and the concentration of economic power made possible by the 
corporate form. 
Despite their economic significance, little has been done to investigate 
whether family businesses contribute to wealth inequality. This Article offers 
the first legal, and one of the only academic, treatments of the topic and shows 
that family businesses play a double role. On the one hand, family businesses 
reinforce existing disparities in wealth and opportunity. Heirs, after all, stand 
to benefit from the hard work of previous generations. On the other hand, 
family businesses can be a powerful antidote to inequality, disrupting 
entrenched class hierarchies and creating opportunities for individuals, 
families, and ethnic communities. 
This Article concludes that whether family businesses produce net social 
costs or benefits depends crucially on two principal factors. First, to the extent 
there is a lack of public investment in social mobility, family businesses can 
increase the distribution of wealth by providing needed investments in human 
capital. Second, to the extent the rewards of capitalism are not widely shared, 
family businesses can offer a source of opportunity for family members, 
employees, and the communities in which family businesses operate. Thus, 
family businesses should not be viewed in isolation; a comprehensive response 
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College; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Derek Black, Josie Brown, Eric Chiappinelli, Lisa 
Eichhorn, Pamela Foohey, Susan Kuo, Donald Langevoort, Martin McWilliams, Haskell Murray, Kenneth 
Rosen, Joseph Yockey, and workshop participants at the University of Houston Law Center and the Law and 
Entrepreneurship Association hosted by the University of Georgia School of Law for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. Jacob Henerey, Patrick Schmeckpeper, and Candle Wester provided excellent research 
assistance. 
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to the problem of wealth inequality must involve the state, the family, and the 
market. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wealth inequality endangers democratic values and calls for a public 
response.1 Acknowledging the problem, Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal 
Reserve Board, recently presented evidence that “[t]he distribution of income 
and wealth in the United States has been widening more or less steadily for 
several decades, to a greater extent than in most advanced countries.”2 This 
gap, she observed, is as wide as it has been in a hundred years and undermines 
efforts to achieve a meaningful equality of opportunity.3 The nation’s top 0.1% 
alone is worth approximately as much as the bottom 90%.4 
How did we reach this state of affairs? Although the Constitution prohibits 
inherited titles and other perquisites of nobility,5 nothing in the logic of 
capitalism prevents the accumulation of vast, intractable disparities in wealth.6 
Indeed, concentrated economic power can be self-perpetuating.7 This Article 
 
 1 See Joseph R. Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 
671 (2014) (“The constitutional problem of oligarchy is the danger that concentrations of economic power and 
political power may be mutually reinforcing—and that because of this, sufficiently extreme concentrations of 
power may threaten the Constitution’s democratic foundations.”). 
 2 Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Keynote Address at the Conference 
on Economic Opportunity and Inequality: Perspectives on Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141017a.htm. 
 3 Id. (“[I]t is appropriate to ask whether this trend is compatible with values rooted in our nation’s 
history, among them the high value Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”). 
 4 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Exploding Wealth Inequality in the United States, WASH. 
CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Oct. 20, 2014), http://equitablegrowth.org/exploding-wealth-inequality-united-
states/ (“The share of wealth held by the top 0.1 percent of families is now almost as high as in the late 1920s, 
when ‘The Great Gatsby’ defined an era that rested on the inherited fortunes of the robber barons of the Gilded 
Age.”). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”). 
Anti-nobility rules “were part of an American reaction to feudalism.” Richard Delgado, Inequality “From the 
Top”: Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 
100, 110 (1984). 
 6 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) 
(2013) (“[T]here is no natural, spontaneous process to prevent destabilizing, inegalitarian forces from 
prevailing permanently.”). 
 7 See id. at 27 (arguing that “the process by which wealth is accumulated and distributed contains 
powerful forces pushing toward divergence, or at any rate toward an extremely high level of inequality”). 
These forces “are potentially threatening to democratic societies and to the values of social justice on which 
they are based.” Id. at 571; see Yellen, supra note 2 (“[T]o the extent that opportunity itself is enhanced by 
access to economic resources, inequality of outcomes can exacerbate inequality of opportunity, thereby 
perpetuating a trend of increasing inequality.”). 
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contends that family businesses merit special scrutiny as a potential source of 
inequality because they combine two of society’s most important economic 
institutions: family and business.8 As such, family businesses implicate 
concerns regarding both inherited wealth and the concentration of economic 
power made possible by the corporate form. 
Typically, owners seek to increase family wealth, to provide employment 
for family members, and, ultimately, to transfer control to a new generation of 
family owners.9 Nor are these kinship preferences inconsequential.10 The ten 
wealthiest families in the U.S. derive their fortune from a family-business 
venture.11 Federal Reserve Chair Yellen further observes that the wealthiest 
Americans are much more likely than their fellow citizens to have shares in 
private, often family-owned businesses.12 More general assessments of the 
prevalence of family ownership vary, but all commentators agree that family 
 
 8 See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1228 
(2013) [hereinafter Means, Nonmarket Values] (“[F]amily businesses harness the shared commitment of 
family members to achieve both economic success and personal fulfillment . . . .”). A family business may be 
defined, broadly, “to include businesses in which effective control rests in family hands and at least two family 
members are involved as owners or managers.” Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family 
Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 676 n.1 (2014) [hereinafter Means, Contractual Foundation]. 
 9 See Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, The Role of Family in Family Firms, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 2006, at 73, 74 (“Family firms are characterized by a concentration of ownership, control and often key 
management positions among family members, even after the retirement of the firms’ founders.”); Peter 
Jaskiewicz et al., Is Nepotism Good or Bad? Types of Nepotism and Implications for Knowledge Management, 
26 FAM. BUS. REV. 121, 121 (2013) (“Nepotism is a common hiring mechanism in (family) firms where 
families use their control to hire family members—therefore perpetuating family involvement over time and 
across generations.”). 
 10 See Business in the Blood, ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
business/21629385-companies-controlled-founding-families-remain-surprisingly-important-and-look-set-stay 
(“Founding dynasties run, or wield significant clout at, some of the world’s largest multinationals, from 
Walmart to Mars, Samsung to BMW.”). 
 11 See Nick Kirkpatrick & Justin Moyer, Meet America’s Richest Families, Courtesy of Forbes, WASH. 
POST (July 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/11/meet-americas-
richest-families/ (summarizing data). The list includes the Walton family (Wal-Mart), the Koch family (Koch 
Industries), the Mars family (Mars, Inc.), the Cargill-MacMillan family (Cargill, Inc.), the Johnson family 
(Fidelity), the Hearst family (Hearst Corp.), the Cox family (Cox Communications), the Pritzker family (Hyatt 
hotel chain), the S.C. Johnson family (S.C. Johnson, Inc.), and the Duncan family (Enterprise Products 
Partners). Id. Although the Forbes methodology leaves something to be desired, as journalists may overlook 
private fortunes invested in more diversified holdings, “[f]or the largest inherited fortunes, on the order of tens 
of billions of dollars or euros, one can probably assume that most of the money remains invested in the family 
firm.” PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 441. 
 12 Yellen, supra note 2 (reporting that “slightly more than half of the top 5 percent of households have a 
share in a private business”). By contrast, “[o]nly 14 percent of families in the next 45 have ownership in a 
private business, but for those that do, this type of wealth constitutes a substantial portion of their assets.” Id. 
Yellen clarifies that “ownership of a private business . . . usually means ownership and sometimes direct 
management of a family business.” Id. 
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businesses play a major role in the economy.13 According to one estimate, 
“[f]amily dominated businesses comprise more than 80 percent of U.S. 
enterprises, employ more than 50 percent of the nation’s workforce, and 
account for the bulk . . . of America’s gross domestic product.”14 
Despite their economic importance, little has been done to investigate 
whether family businesses contribute to wealth inequality. This Article offers 
the first legal,15 and one of the only academic, treatments of the topic,16 and it 
shows that family businesses play a double role. On the one hand, family 
businesses can entrench existing disparities in wealth and opportunity. Heirs, 
after all, stand to benefit from the hard work of previous generations. On the 
other hand, family businesses can be a powerful antidote to inequality. By 
facilitating the accumulation of capital, family businesses can disrupt 
entrenched class hierarchies and create opportunities for individuals, families, 
and ethnic communities.17 As one court observed, “small businesses . . . have 
been for many immigrant groups, and continue to be, the first rung on the 
ladder of American success.”18 
This Article concludes that whether family businesses produce net social 
costs or benefits depends crucially on two principal factors. First, to the extent 
there is a lack of public investment in social mobility, family businesses can 
increase the distribution of wealth by providing needed investments in human 
 
 13 See, e.g., Joseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, Family Businesses’ Contribution to the U.S. 
Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 211, 217–18 (2003) (“No matter what criteria are used, family 
businesses represent a substantial portion of the U.S. economy and have a massive impact on the economy as a 
whole.”). 
 14 DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 274 (2d ed. 2008). 
 15 In general, legal academics have paid little attention to the distinctive characteristics of family 
ownership. See Eric A. Chiappinelli, Stories from Camp Automotive: Communicating the Importance of 
Family Dynamics to Corporate Law Students, 34 GA. L. REV. 699, 710 (2000) (observing that “corporate law 
casebooks are astonishingly devoid of any systematic consideration of family dynamics”); Means, Nonmarket 
Values, supra note 8, at 1193 (noting that “the study of family businesses for U.S. legal scholars has remained 
in large part the specialized province of estate planners and tax lawyers”). 
 16 See Paul Bingley, Miles Corak & Niels Westergård-Nielsen, Equality of Opportunity and 
Intergenerational Transmission of Employers, in FROM PARENTS TO CHILDREN: THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGE 441 (John Ermisch, Markus Jäntti & Timothy Smeeding eds., 2012). Professor 
Bingley and his coauthors analyze data regarding the employment of sons in firms that had also employed the 
father and consider family-business ownership as one possible, partial explanation for the overlap. Id. at 458. 
 17 See JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 146 (2014) (arguing 
that “[a]s far as possible, there should be a plurality of paths leading to the valued roles and goods, without 
bottlenecks through which one must pass in order to reach them”). Even if family businesses restrict 
opportunities for the benefit of family members, they also represent a different path to success and thereby 
create opportunities for individuals who, for example, might perform poorly on standardized tests.  
 18 EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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capital. Second, to the extent the rewards of capitalism are not widely shared, 
family businesses can offer a source of opportunity, not just for family 
members, but also for employees and the communities in which family 
businesses operate. Thus, family businesses should not be viewed in isolation; 
a comprehensive response to the problem of wealth inequality must involve the 
state, the family, and the market.19 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem of wealth 
inequality but argues that proposals to curtail inherited wealth should not 
overlook the role family businesses play in creating opportunities. Part II 
evaluates family businesses from a market perspective, reviewing evidence 
regarding their competitiveness and offering suggestions for legal design to 
ensure that markets constrain value-destroying choices. Part III considers the 
extent to which family values can offer economic and social benefits for a 
wider set of stakeholders, as well as the risk that family conflict will spill over 
into the business environment. Part IV uses the remarkable story of the Market 
Basket supermarket chain’s rise, near collapse, and subsequent resurgence to 
illustrate this Article’s arguments regarding family business ownership and 
wealth inequality. 
I. WEALTH INEQUALITY 
In the United States, the gap between rich and poor has widened to levels 
not seen since the 1920s.20 More troubling, wealth inequality persists across 
generations; the social and economic status of a child’s parents has a very 
strong influence on her future prospects.21 Such pervasive, entrenched 
inequality is inconsistent with central tenets of the American Dream—that 
 
 19 See HAROLD JAMES, FAMILY CAPITALISM 1 (2006) (identifying as a central theme “the interplay of 
three powerful social constellations, families, states, and markets”); Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality 
of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2013, at 79, 80 (“The interaction 
between families, labor markets, and public policies all structure a child’s opportunities and determine the 
extent to which adult earnings are related to family background . . . .”). 
 20 See Yellen, supra note 2. According to one commentator, a Nobel laureate in economics, “[W]e 
haven’t just gone back to nineteenth-century levels of income inequality, we’re also on a path back to 
‘patrimonial capitalism,’ in which the commanding heights of the economy are controlled not by talented 
individuals but by family dynasties.” Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 
8, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/articles/archives/2014/may/08/thomas-piketty-
new-gilded-age/ (reviewing PIKETTY, supra note 6). 
 21 See HARRY BRIGHOUSE & ADAM SWIFT, FAMILY VALUES: THE ETHICS OF PARENT–CHILD 
RELATIONSHIPS 2 (2014) (“[H]owever we frame or measure the inequality, it is clear that children born into 
different families face unequal prospects.”). 
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merit will be rewarded and that anyone who works hard can hope to achieve 
success.22 
Yet, even if economic inheritances were sharply curtailed, successful 
parents would continue to give many other valuable advantages to their 
children.23 For example, the child of an entrepreneur has an excellent chance to 
learn first hand the skillset necessary to run a business.24 Short of abolishing 
families and raising children communally, we cannot prevent families from 
equipping their children for success in life, a task that they will perform more 
or less well with the economic, cultural, and social resources at their disposal.25 
Thus, to the extent families take primary responsibility for raising children, no 
liberal society can promise full equality of opportunity to each of its citizens.26 
Only by appreciating this context can we usefully evaluate the impact of 
family businesses on wealth inequality. Specifically, this Part argues that the 
relevant issue is not whether family businesses would detract from an 
otherwise perfect meritocracy, but whether (and how) family businesses affect 
our society’s overall opportunity structure.27 Framed this way, as an example 
 
 22 The American Dream is not the only conception of equal opportunity. According to some scholars, 
intelligence, athleticism, beauty, and perhaps even mental dispositions constitute morally arbitrary advantages 
that should not entitle a person to claim more of society’s resources. See John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of 
Equality (1975), reprinted in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 254, 264 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
 23 As one scholar explains, “The basic problem arises because parents—and families more generally—
act in ways that give their children advantages.” FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 48. Yet, “[p]arents do this to 
different degrees and in different ways, creating inequalities of opportunity that begin early, run deep, and tend 
to persist.” Id.  
 24 See, e.g., Adam Bryant, Three Keys to Hiring: Skill, Will and Fit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/business/corner-office-marla-malcolm-becks-three-keys-to-hiring-skill-
will-and-fit.html (detailing an interview with Marla Malcolm Beck, Chief Executive of Bluemercury, a beauty 
products and spa services retailer). “My dad was an entrepreneur. He started an insurance agency and a real 
estate company, and I worked in his office from the time I was 9. When I was in high school, I used to balance 
his books.” Id. 
 25 See BRIGHOUSE & SWIFT, supra note 21, at 2 (arguing that the problem is to provide for equal 
opportunity in even “the limited sense that people’s chances of achieving desirable jobs should reflect their 
own merits rather their family background”). Professors Brighouse and Swift contend that family autonomy 
and egalitarian justice can be reconciled only if we recognize limits to the principle that “parents should be 
free to act in ways that confer advantage on their children, without regard to any resulting inequalities between 
those children and others.” Id. at 3. 
 26 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 64 (1971) (stating that “the principle of fair opportunity 
can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as [some form] of the family exists”). 
 27 See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
439 (2007) (arguing that it is false to believe that one necessarily achieves a better result by seeking “to 
approximate the optimum as closely as possible, on the apparently reasonable assumption that the more of the 
conditions for optimality that are satisfied, the closer one will get to the optimum”).  
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of what economists call the theory of second best,28 it is plausible that family 
businesses reduce inequality by providing ladders of opportunity. As a locus 
for entrepreneurship and social advancement, family businesses can offset 
inequalities that arise from other forms of inheritance, not to mention more 
pervasive background conditions of social inequality. 
A. The Great Gatsby Curve 
Inheritance practices contribute substantially to wealth inequality.29 
Moreover, the consequences of inheritance are likely to be cumulative, as 
invested capital outperforms the overall economy, a trend that shows no sign of 
abating.30 Unfortunately, the most accurate predictor of a person’s future 
earnings is the socio-economic status of his or her parents.31 Although 
inequality is a global problem, “there is now less social mobility in the United 
States than in other advanced countries.”32 Wealth inequality is disturbing, not 
only because of its magnitude but also because it often reflects family 
background more than individual merit.33 
 
 28 The economic theory of second best contends that in an imperfect world the best available outcome 
might result from fulfilling fewer of the conditions that would pertain in a perfect world. Id.; see also R.G. 
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956) (offering 
first articulation of the theory). 
 29 See Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2182–83, 
2183 n.7 (2011) (citing William G. Gale & John K. Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation 
of Wealth, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 145, 146–47, 156–57). “Economic studies have found that a large 
fraction (possibly in the range of eighty percent) of household wealth in the United States traces to gifts and 
inheritances, as opposed to participation in the labor economy.” Id. 
 30 PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 377–78 (“Whenever the rate of return on capital is significantly and durably 
higher than the growth rate of the economy, it is all but inevitable that inheritance (of fortunes accumulated in 
the past) predominates over saving (wealth accumulated in the present).”). Piketty describes the relation as r > 
g. Id. 
 31 See, e.g., KARL ALEXANDER, DORIS ENTWISLE & LINDA OLSON, THE LONG SHADOW: FAMILY 
BACKGROUND, DISADVANTAGED URBAN YOUTH, AND THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD (2014) (summarizing 
results of a twenty-five-year study that tracked almost 800 individuals in west Baltimore from childhood to 
early adulthood). 
 32 FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 42 (citing Bingley et al., supra note 16; PEW CHARITABLE TRS., DOES 
AMERICA PROMOTE MOBILITY AS WELL AS OTHER NATIONS? 2 (2011)). 
 33 See BRIGHOUSE & SWIFT, supra note 21, at 2 (“The egalitarian challenge demands an account of why 
families should be permitted to create inequalities between children . . . .”). Among other concerns, such 
inequalities seem inconsistent with the meritocratic underpinnings of democracy. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 
241 (“[D]emocratic modernity is founded on the belief that inequalities based on individual talent and effort 
are more justifiable than other inequalities . . . .”). One commentator argues, however, that we should not 
assume that all lasting inequalities can be attributed to a lack of opportunity. See N. Gregory Mankiw, 
Defending the One Percent, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2013, at 21, 25 (“[P]arents and children share genes, a 
fact that would lead to intergenerational persistence in income even in a world of equal opportunities. . . . 
Smart parents are more likely to have smart children.”). 
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In remarks presented at the Center for American Progress on January 12, 
2012, Alan Krueger, then-chair of the American Council of Economic 
Advisors, explained the link between current income inequality and future 
opportunities: 
Higher income inequality would be less of a concern if low-income 
earners became high-income earners at some point in their career, or 
if children of low-income parents had a good chance of climbing up 
the income scales when they grow up. In other words, if we had a 
high degree of income mobility we would be less concerned about 
the degree of inequality in any given year. But we do not. Moreover, 
as inequality has increased, evidence suggests that . . . economic 
mobility has decreased.34 
When grouped by nation, measurements of income inequality and 
“mobility across generations” align, creating what Krueger described as a 
“Great Gatsby Curve”: “The points cluster around an upward sloping line, 
indicating that countries that had more inequality across households also had 
more persistence in income from one generation to the next.”35 Put more 
simply, if your parents are poor, that fact speaks volumes about your own life 
prospects.36 In the United States, income inequality has gone up considerably, 
and Krueger concludes that “[i]t is hard to look at these figures and not be 
concerned that rising inequality is jeopardizing our tradition of equality of 
opportunity.”37 
Recent survey data confirms not only that the rich are “getting richer” but 
that “[t]he typical American has been getting poorer, too.”38 In the wake of the 
Great Recession, households at every income level lost wealth, but 
“households at the bottom of the wealth distribution lost the largest share of 
 
 34 Alan B. Krueger, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in 
the United States, Remarks Before the Center for American Progress (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/sites/default/files/krueger_cap_speech_final_remarks.pdf. 
 35 Id. (citing the work of economist Miles Corak). The reference is, of course, to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
1925 novel The Great Gatsby. 
 36 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 31 (1983) (“The basic 
intuition is that it seems unfair that we should be able to predict eventual positions in a society merely by 
knowing the strata into which children are born.”). 
 37 Krueger, supra note 34, at 4 (“The fortunes of one’s parents seem to matter increasingly in American 
society.”). Or, in one journalist’s pithy formulation, “The American Dream isn’t dead—it just moved to 
Denmark.” Matthew O’Brien, ‘The Great Gatsby Curve’: Why It’s So Hard for the Poor to Get Ahead, 
ATLANTIC (June 18, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/06/the-great-gatsby-curve-why-
its-so-hard-for-the-poor-to-get-ahead/276943/; see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2013). 
 38 Anna Bernasek, The Typical Household, Now Worth a Third Less, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/business/the-typical-household-now-worth-a-third-less.html. 
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their total wealth.”39 According to some measures, wealth inequality “roughly 
doubled” in the decade from 2003 to 2013.40 Taking a longer view, from 1984 
to 2013, the picture looks even worse: those in the 95th percentile saw their 
wealth double; in the 75th percentile, wealth increased by approximately one- 
third; at the median, though, wealth declined by 20%; and, in the bottom 
quartile, wealth declined more than 60%.41 In part, the differences may be 
attributable to the fact that the wealthy have more diverse investment portfolios 
and are better able to navigate market anomalies.42 
This is not to suggest that only a radically egalitarian society will suffice,43 
or even that inequality is always harmful. To the contrary, “[n]o one denies 
that it is important for society to have entrepreneurs, inventions, and 
innovations. . . . The problem is simply that the entrepreneurial argument 
cannot justify all inequalities of wealth, no matter how extreme.”44 At some 
point, the increased incentive for the already wealthy to work hard in order to 
accumulate more capital must be outweighed by the diminishment of 
opportunity for those in the bottom rungs of the economy, who may never have 
the chance to contribute to the full extent of their abilities. Moreover, to the 
extent that returns to capital outpace the overall economy, the wealth 
disparities produced by useful entrepreneurial activity can lead to entrenched 
inequality over generations, well beyond the initial justification for rewarding 
the entrepreneur.45 
 
 39 FABIAN T. PFEFFER, SHELDON DANZIGER & ROBERT F. SCHOENI, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND., RESEARCH 
SUMMARY: WEALTH LEVELS, WEALTH INEQUALITY, AND THE GREAT RECESSION 2 (2014), http://web.stanford. 
edu/group/scspi/_media/working_papers/pfeffer-danziger-schoeni_wealth-levels.pdf. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 1 (“Affluent households are more likely than other households to hold stocks and have large 
portfolios, which allowed them to benefit from the gains in the stock market.”). 
 43 If individual liberty and family autonomy are also foundational values, and equality is not the sole end 
of a just society, then there may be necessary tradeoffs. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in 
LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 212 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (distinguishing value 
pluralism from the reductive simplicity of monism: “This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all the 
positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one 
another”). Notably, some scholarly treatments of inequality do not seek to accommodate competing values. 
See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) 
(“[R]evisit[ing] the topic of inheritance taxation to see whether a single-minded focus on equality of 
opportunity, interpreted as resource equality, can shed new light on questions of legal design.”). 
 44 PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 443. 
 45 See id. (“[N]o matter how justified inequalities of wealth may be initially, fortunes can grow and 
perpetuate themselves beyond all reasonable limits and beyond any possible rational justification in terms of 
social utility.”). 
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B. Family Autonomy 
Although the phenomenon of wealth inequality is clear, it resists easy 
answers. This section summarizes a “trilemma” identified by the philosopher 
James Fishkin and elaborated in a recent book by the law professor Joseph 
Fishkin.46 In brief, it is not possible to stipulate simultaneously that social 
goods are to be awarded according to a principle of merit, that each individual 
will have a fair chance to compete, and that families are free to “pass on 
advantages to their children.”47 Nor is it clear whether society would benefit 
from more modest efforts to advance the principles of merit and equality by 
restricting economic inheritances without intruding upon the core principle of 
family autonomy. Such restrictions on inheritance would leave untouched the 
vast disparities in cultural and educational resources that replicate inequality 
across generations. Moreover, as discussed in the following section, an 
incomplete approach could produce perverse results by reinforcing the existing 
class structure. 
1. How Families Create Inequality 
The horns of the trilemma may not always be apparent48 because liberalism 
tends to focus on autonomous individuals and to ignore family life.49 Thus, the 
familiar tension between liberty and equality has not “systematically 
incorporated” “the role of the family in generating inequalities.”50 For 
example, equality of opportunity might offer a useful compromise between 
liberty and equality, but it cannot be achieved without serious intrusions into 
 
 46 In light of this Article’s inquiry into the transmission of opportunities across generations, the reader 
may not be surprised to learn that James is Joseph’s father, and that Joseph credits his upbringing for his own 
development as a scholar. FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 260. In the spirit of disclosure, the author of this Article 
acknowledges the tremendous advantages provided to him by his own parents, including legacy consideration 
for admission to an Ivy League college—whether or not that legacy status was decisive might be debated by 
the reasonable observer and the author’s mother.  
 47 FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 53. 
 48 Perhaps the appropriate visual image here is a triceratops? My four-year-old would approve. 
 49 See FISHKIN, supra note 36, at 2 (“Liberalism presents us with a picture of isolated, atomic individuals 
who seem to spring from nowhere in order to experience utility or claim rights or enjoy liberties and then 
vanish.”). 
 50 Id. at 2. 
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the autonomy of family life.51 Families are a crucial source of inequality, and 
inherited financial resources are only one aspect of this inequality.52 
Consider a recent New York Times profile of Michael Brantley, a 
professional baseball player.53 Brantley plays for the Cleveland Indians and has 
one of the best slugging percentages in the league, powered by a “smooth 
left-handed swing.”54 As it happens, Brantley’s father was a hitting coach for 
the New York Mets, and so Brantley grew up around professional players and 
had access to professional coaching.55 According to Brantley’s account, the 
advantages went beyond the opportunity to perfect the mechanics of his swing: 
“Being around major league players at that young age, seeing how they acted, 
seeing how they prepared, it just made me want to get better and kind of 
showed me how to carry myself.”56 
The importance of connections and background extends to professions of 
every kind. The family acculturation that causes the daughter in one family to 
pursue acting or directing57 may cause another to contemplate joining a family 
business selling used books.58 Moreover, entry into a specialized business is 
easier when, for instance, you have spent half a lifetime watching your parents 
set prices for books59 or select the right kind of herring.60 And the same could 
 
 51 Id. at 4 (“Once the role of the family is taken into account, the apparently moderate aspiration of equal 
opportunity produces conflicts with the private sphere of liberty—with autonomous family relations—that are 
nothing short of intractable.”). The autonomy of family life includes a parental right “to substantially influence 
the development of their children.” Id. at 5. 
 52 See id. at 1 (“The family is the one crucial source of inequality in modern society that has gone largely 
unexamined in the theory of distributive justice.”). 
 53 See Tyler Kepner, A Paternal Touch Yields a Smooth Swing: Cleveland’s Brantley Succeeds at the 
Plate with Help from His Father, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/sports/ 
baseball/clevelands-brantley-succeeds-at-the-plate-with-help-from-his-father.html. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. Later, scouts took this background into account as a reason to take a chance on Brantley. Id. (“The 
Indians, notably the scout Don Poplin, liked Brantley for his swing, athleticism, bloodlines and, perhaps most 
of all, his approach to the game.” (emphasis added)). 
 57 See ADAM BELLOW, IN PRAISE OF NEPOTISM: A NATURAL HISTORY 498 (2003) (noting the many 
members of the Coppola family, including Sofia, who have established careers in Hollywood). 
 58 See Janet Malcolm, The Book Refuge: Three Sisters Keep a Family Business Going, NEW YORKER 
(June 23, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-book-refuge. 
 59 See id. (“‘To prepare my daughters for a bookselling career, I conducted classes in the bookstore by 
going over new acquisitions with them,’ [the bookstore’s founder] wrote in his autobiography. ‘I would take 
center position and comment on each book as I handled it. Later each of the girls took turns pricing the books, 
with me on the sidelines watching and only occasionally correcting. They have often corrected me, and 
justifiably.’”). 
 60 Sometimes, the transition from generation to generation leaves something to be desired in the 
execution: 
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be said for commercial fishing,61 cheesemaking,62 book selling,63 hardware,64 
jewelry,65 or the operation of resort hotels.66 
As long as family remains the institution primarily responsible for raising 
children, the odds that a talented child will realize his or her potential will 
depend in large part upon the economic, cultural, and social resources of the 
family. Therefore, “unless we are willing to destroy the family and move to a 
system of collective childrearing, like the one contemplated in Plato’s Republic 
or in mythologized versions of early Israeli kibbutz experiments, life chances 
will never be completely independent of circumstances of birth.”67 
Alternatively, if families are permitted to convey advantages to children, 
teaching the values and life skills necessary for professional success, then 
affirmative action programs undertaken as a corrective measure to preserve fair 
life chances would violate the merit principle “by placing individuals who have 
faced disadvantages based on their birth circumstances in educational places 
and jobs for which they are less formally qualified.”68 Accordingly, tradeoffs 
 
When I decided to stop practicing law and go into the family business full-time, I asked my 
father to teach me how to tell a good fish from a bad fish. “No problem,” he said. “I’ll teach you 
the same way your grandfather taught me. First, we’ll go to the smokehouses and you’ll watch 
how I look at, feel, and taste the fish. . . . [A]fter ten years, maybe you’ll know how to tell a good 
piece of fish from a bad one.” Soon after this conversation, my father was forced by ill health to 
retire. Not long after that, he died. 
MARK RUSS FEDERMAN, RUSS & DAUGHTERS: REFLECTIONS AND RECIPES FROM THE HOUSE THAT HERRING 
BUILT 127 (2013). 
 61 CARL COREY, FOR LOVE AND MONEY: PORTRAITS OF WISCONSIN FAMILY BUSINESSES 48 (2014) (“At 
age eight, Alvin Anderson . . . was the first deckhand . . . . A generation later his son Dan . . . slept in a net box 
on the boat while his parents, Alvin and Sandy, worked. Dan . . . returns every spring to fish with his father in 
the original boat.”). 
 62 Id. at 68 (“Master cheesemaker Sid Cook began making cheese as a child but his cheesemaking 
lineage goes back much further—more than 125 years.”). 
 63 Id. at 88 (“Janke Book Store, run by Carl Janke’s grandchildren, Jim Janke and Jane Janke Johnson, is 
known for its community involvement and knowledgeable staff members.”). 
 64 Id. at 90 (noting that Lullof Hardware was established in 1920 and is today owned and operated by two 
sons and a grandson who “run a true old-fashioned hardware store, providing service and selling goods from 
washing machines to feed”). 
 65 Id. at 54 (“Siblings Karen Nelson and Dale Nummi run Nummi Jewelers, which was founded by their 
father, Harry, a watchmaker.”). 
 66 Id. at 98 (noting that the Afterglow Resort, established in 1949, is now owned and operated by the son 
and daughter-in-law of the founder). 
 67 FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 53. 
 68 Id. So-called “leveling up” strategies give additional resources to those who are disadvantaged but 
cannot fully compensate for the “rich, iterative early interactions between children and parents.” Id. at 55. 
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are unavoidable; we cannot guarantee simultaneously that merit will be 
rewarded, equal opportunities afforded, and family autonomy respected. 
2. Curtailing Inherited Wealth 
Conceding that our fundamental values conflict does not leave us powerless 
to enact policies that will improve our current circumstances. Rather than let 
the perfect be the enemy of the good, we can take concrete steps to create 
greater equality of opportunity where it is possible to do so without 
encroaching upon other important values. For example, some argue that we 
should reduce disparities in life opportunities by limiting the transfer of 
economic resources across generations. In his 2015 State of the Union address, 
President Obama called for Congress to “close the loopholes that lead to 
inequality by allowing the top one percent to avoid paying taxes on their 
accumulated wealth.”69 To that end, the White House has advocated for an end 
to tax exemptions that often permit heirs to take wealth accumulated by their 
parents without paying any taxes.70 The President’s proposal, which closely 
resembles arguments advanced by the tax scholar Victor Fleischer,71 would 
make the transfer of accumulated capital gains at death a taxable event—for 
capital held in a business, often the first time any taxes would have been 
paid.72 
More aggressively, some legal scholars have argued that inheritance and 
estate taxes should be used to restrict or even abolish the transfer of economic 
resources.73 Inheritance law might be restructured to achieve both a “leveling 
 
 69 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 20, 2015).  
 70 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Will Seek to Raise Taxes on Wealthy to Finance Cuts for Middle Class, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/us/president-obama-will-seek-to-reduce-
taxes-for-middle-class.html (“The centerpiece of the plan . . . would eliminate what Mr. Obama’s advisers call 
the ‘trust-fund loophole,’ a provision governing inherited assets that shields hundreds of billions of dollars 
from taxation each year.”). 
 71 See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 60 (2011) (arguing that “[t]axing 
founders at a low rate is a conspicuous loophole in the fabric of our progressive income tax system, uniquely 
undermining our shared commitment to equal opportunity and distributive justice”); see also infra Part II.C.2 
(discussing Professor Fleischer’s proposal). 
 72 Equally important, the proposed rules would level the playing field by requiring heirs to pay taxes on 
all earnings that would have been taxable to the testator. Under existing rules, heirs take a “stepped up” basis 
so that their eventual tax bill, whenever the transferred asset is sold, includes only changes in valuation since 
the heirs acquired ownership. See infra Part III.C.2 
 73 See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (1990) (rejecting the 
metaphor of a level playing field: “For no particularly good reason, we allow some players, typically those 
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down” to reduce unequal private inheritances and a “leveling up” to ensure 
everyone receives adequate resources “to start adult life from a position of 
equality.”74 As these commentators observe, a society based on merit alone 
will not achieve substantial equality of opportunity since it “leave[s] 
uncorrected the brute luck that affects early development and the resources to 
which one has access.”75 Indeed, it might be argued that “[c]hildren lucky 
enough to have been raised, acculturated, and educated by wealthy parents 
need not be allowed the additional good fortune of inheriting their parents’ 
property.”76 Embracing one horn of the trilemma, these scholars insist upon the 
priority of individuals, not families.77 
However, setting aside the merits of achieving a formal equality of 
economic resources through obliterating levels of taxation,78 such measures 
would prevent only direct transfers of financial resources and leave untouched 
the features of family life that make it easier for privileged children to replicate 
their parents’ success. Whatever the merits of eliminating economic 
inheritances (which would, among other things, preclude the direct transfer of 
family businesses from generation to generation),79 a system of taxation would 
not purport to regulate directly “the core of parent–child relations, namely, 
 
most culturally and educationally advantaged, to inherit huge amounts of wealth, unearned in any sense at 
all”). 
 74 Alstott, supra note 43, at 472. In addition to the inheritance tax, Professor Alstott’s approach to 
achieving equal opportunity would include “a social inheritance, meaning a government expenditure program 
that would pay a universal, public inheritance.” Id.; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE 
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 3–5 (1999) (proposing that each U.S. citizen receive $80,000 at adulthood to be used 
for any purpose). 
 75 Alstott, supra note 43, at 486. 
 76 Ascher, supra note 73, at 74; see also Rawls, supra note 22, at 264 (“Those favored by social and 
natural contingencies regard themselves as already compensated, as it were, by advantages to which no one 
(including themselves) had a prior claim.”); Alstott, supra note 43, at 488 (“Being born to rich (or poor) 
parents is a matter of brute luck, and so the conventional equal opportunity prescription is to tax material 
inheritance heavily, perhaps even to confiscate it.”). 
 77 Alstott, supra note 43, at 518 (refusing to “view the family rather than the individual as the real unit”). 
 78 For example, some scholars worry that estate taxation can create a disincentive for wealth creation and 
that wealth equality should be pursued through other means. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1994) (identifying “likely consequences of a strengthened 
transfer tax, such as reduced work, reduced savings, and increased inequality in consumption”). 
 79 See Ascher, supra note 73, at 73 (“My major premise is that all property owned at death, after payment 
of debts and administration expenses, should be sold and the proceeds paid to the United States government.”). 
Professor Ascher would resist the label “confiscation” as it is his position that property rights terminate at 
death. Id. 
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consensual efforts to influence child development.”80 As long as the family 
endures in its current form, true social equality cannot be realized. 
C. The Risk of Piecemeal Reform 
Not only would policies designed to curtail economic inheritances fail to 
achieve their social goals, such policies would risk reinforcing the very 
inequalities they sought to combat. That is, even if those “lucky enough to 
have been raised . . . by wealthy parents need not be allowed the additional 
good fortune of inheriting their parents’ property,”81 it does not follow that 
taking away those inheritances would produce a more egalitarian society. 
Consider the implicit logic: (1) in a society governed exclusively by the 
principle of equality, children would inherit no special advantages from their 
parents; (2) given the importance of liberty in our society, it is not possible to 
intrude upon the parent–child relationship so as to block the transmission of all 
such advantages; (3) restricting economic inheritances does not violate any 
core interest of family autonomy; (4) therefore, to best approximate conditions 
of equality, we ought to curtail economic inheritances. Or, more simply, doing 
something is better than doing nothing. 
The fatal flaw in the logic is that it assumes that the best course of action is 
that which most closely approximates the outcome under ideal 
circumstances.82 Yet, if the surrounding circumstances also depart from the 
ideal, the correct course of action may be quite different because of the 
influence of other variables. Jon Elster recounts that “when Mao Tse-tung 
decided to eliminate sparrows because they ate grain, he had to reimport them 
later from the Soviet Union when the pests they kept down flourished, with 
catastrophic ecological results.”83 Mao Tse-tung’s edict has a similar apparent 
logic: (1) in a perfect world, crops intended for human consumption would 
never be eaten by birds, insects, or animals; (2) it is not possible to destroy all 
such culprits; (3) it is possible to kill sparrows; (4) to best approximate a world 
in which crops are eaten only by humans, we should kill the sparrows. Of 
 
 80 FISHKIN, supra note 36, at 38. Professor Fishkin argues that the principle of family autonomy he 
espouses should “not be construed to protect nepotism, the buying of positions, or large-scale inheritance.” Id. 
at 37 (“Such practices would raise obvious conflicts with any attempts to fully institutionalize merit.”). 
 81 Ascher, supra note 73, at 74. 
 82 To be clear, the use of the term “ideal” refers to a society in which each person has an equal set of 
opportunities (however measured) and does not imply any endorsement of a society that would relentlessly 
pursue a single value at the expense of all others. 
 83 ELSTER, supra note 27, at 441. 
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course, Mao Tse-tung overlooked the fact that sparrows are one part of a 
complex ecosystem. 
Piecemeal reforms enacted without consideration of their systemic context 
can make matters worse. In the formal language of economics, this is known as 
the problem of second best: 
The general theory of second best holds that where it is not possible 
to satisfy all the conditions necessary for an economic system to 
reach an overall optimum, it is not generally desirable to satisfy as 
many of those conditions as possible. Rather, the failure to satisfy 
optimality conditions on one variable means that other variables must 
take on suboptimal values as well, in order to compensate for the 
initial failure.84 
If one or more variables outside our control are suboptimal, the variables 
that we do control may need to counterbalance those other variables.85 The 
goal is to make the overall system work as well as possible. Adjusting any 
particular variable—say, the taxation of inherited wealth—should not be an 
end in itself. Still, it could be the case that curtailing inherited wealth would be 
a highly desirable strategy for curbing wealth inequality. The theory of the 
second best does not tell us whether to kill sparrows; it simply cautions us to 
base our judgment on real-world conditions. 
By applying the theory of second best to family businesses, we can better 
appreciate why the advantages family businesses confer on family members 
(and, sometimes, members of a wider ethnic community) might compensate 
for other background conditions of inequality.86 In particular, wealth amassed 
over generations may enable families to propel their children and 
grandchildren from wage labor into professional occupations.87 Family ties can 
 
 84 Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17 (2009). 
 85 The poet Seamus Heaney explores a similar idea when he describes a “solid iron” weight of 
“socket-ripping[]/Life-belittling force” only to note that once balanced “[a]gainst another one placed on a 
weighbridge[]/ . . . everything trembled, flowed with give and take.” SEAMUS HEANEY, Weighing In, in THE 
SPIRIT LEVEL 17, 17 (1996). Heaney contends that “this is all the good tidings amount to . . . just having 
to/Balance the intolerable in others/Against our own.” Id. 
 86 In general, “[i]ndividuals’ opportunities to pursue different combinations of forms of flourishing that 
they choose for themselves depend in a significant way on the structure of work and the broader structure of 
capitalism.” FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 220. 
 87 To be sure, entrepreneurship is not the only route to success. Blue-collar jobs used to provide security 
for families, although recent increases in corporate profitability have often come at the expense of wages and 
security for middle-class families. See TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING 
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help newer immigrants establish businesses when traditional bank loans and 
non-family labor would otherwise be impossible to secure.88 Also, family 
businesses may provide employment for those who lack conventional 
qualifications or who are discriminated against.89 For these reasons, kinship 
and ethnic preferences in family businesses arguably amount to a form of 
private affirmative action that facilitates integration by moving families and 
communities into the middle class.90 
While it might be that redistributing wealth each generation would create a 
more level playing field, a ban on inherited wealth could also have the perverse 
effect of locking into place existing class distinctions. After all, the children of 
accountants, dentists, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals do not need to 
inherit their parents’ wealth in order to replicate their accomplishments. 
Equally talented children from working-class backgrounds lack comparable 
opportunities for success, not just because they are poorer, but because they do 
not have access to the same educational, cultural, and social resources.91 In this 
regard, the accumulation of capital facilitated by family businesses can reduce 
inequality by creating additional pathways for success.92 
 
INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 25 (2012). For some individuals, military service may 
be tempting because of the longer-term health and education benefits available to veterans and their families. 
 88 See Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 923 (1999) 
(discussing informal systems of community credit); Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the 
Pale?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521, 1531 (2003) [hereinafter Cao, Diaspora] (“For members of these 
transitional or marginal groups especially, who may lack mainstream advantages, turning inward and utilizing 
available ethnic resources to engage in community ethnic preferences within the ethnic economy will be 
crucial for their economic well-being.”). 
 89 See Cao, Diaspora, supra note 88, at 1612 (“For non-English speakers . . . the barriers to entering the 
general labor force are often quite high.”); Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, 
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1092 (1994) (arguing that “the American labor 
market . . . includes Asian Americans, but only in lower-tier jobs with poor pay and dim advancement 
prospects, and only while retaining structural barriers to exclude Asian Americans from primary-sector jobs 
with better compensation, benefits, and upward mobility”). 
 90 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1195, 1195 (2002) (arguing that the central, if sometimes misunderstood purpose of affirmative action is to 
achieve “racial integration”). 
 91 See, e.g., America’s New Aristocracy, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21640331-importance-intellectual-capital-grows-privilege-has-become-increasingly (noting that 
“America is one of only three advanced countries where the government spends more on schools in rich areas 
than in poor ones”). 
 92 Even when a family business is illegal, the founders may use their ill-gotten resources to support a 
“quiet and determined push toward respectability” for subsequent generations. See Malcolm Gladwell, The 
Crooked Ladder: The Criminal’s Guide to Upward Mobility, NEW YORKER (Aug. 11, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/11/crooked-ladder. By the fourth generation, most members of 
one family known for its involvement in organized crime “were firmly planted in the American upper middle 
class.” Id.  
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Perhaps, rather than restricting economic inheritances in order to better 
approximate the conditions of economic equality that would pertain in a 
perfect meritocracy, we ought to focus on a smaller set of outsized fortunes. 
Even if mom and pop businesses reduce wealth inequality, family-controlled 
capital beyond a certain scale may tend to entrench inequality rather than to 
relieve it.93 But this qualification only reinforces the point: we should not 
assume that economic redistribution will invariably produce a more equal 
society; instead, we should seek to identify policies that will, in fact, produce 
that result. 
II. THE ROLE OF MARKETS 
To the extent family businesses provide entrepreneurial opportunities that 
reduce wealth inequality, we should consider whether family businesses, 
having served that function, are likely to ossify into dynastic wealth. To 
address the concern, this Part examines the market context in which family 
businesses operate. 
Markets have both inegalitarian and egalitarian implications. In a 
competitive marketplace, wealth inequality is inevitable. For example, if a 
company decided to pay all its workers the same wage, either the more skilled 
labor would leave for other firms, or the cost of raising salaries for less skilled 
workers would make the business uncompetitive, and “it [might] no longer be 
possible to compete for buyers or capital against efficiently inegalitarian 
firms.”94 The adverse reaction to an entrepreneur’s recent decision to set a 
$75,000 minimum salary for all his employees reflects both kinds of 
concerns.95 Also, market outcomes reflect inputs; if one competitor begins with 
more capital to invest in the market, she has a significant advantage. 
 
 93 For example, in South Korea “[a]bout 20 families run the huge conglomerates or chaebol that make up 
60% of the country’s stockmarket value and most of its exports.” To Those that Have: The Dark Side of 
Family Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21648178-
dark-side-family-capitalism-those-have. To be sure, inequality is not the only relevant consideration; for 
example, tax policy must also consider the effect on incentives to generate wealth. See McCaffery, supra note 
78, at 288. A poorly designed policy could reduce social wealth. 
 94 DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 26 (1981) (“This point provides an almost ineluctable restraint 
against equality in unregulated market systems.”). 
 95 See Patricia Cohen, A Company Copes with Backlash Against the Raise that Roared, N.Y. TIMES (July 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/business/a-company-copes-with-backlash-against-the-raise-
that-roared.html (describing how a “swashbuckling blow against income inequality” led some of a company’s 
most valuable employees to leave “spurred in part by their view that it was unfair to double the pay of some 
new hires while the longest-serving staff members got small or no raises”). Some customers left, as well, 
because they expected their fees to go up to cover the cost of the raise. Id. 
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Nevertheless, the market mechanism itself provides a neutral test of merit, 
one that is not overawed by inherited privileges. For a family business to 
survive, it must actually be the case that “family processes contribute to the 
efficient and effective functioning of the company.”96 Notably, very few 
family businesses continue into a second generation, let alone a third or 
fourth.97 Thus, by rewarding merit, well-regulated markets can help to ensure 
that successful family businesses avoid the worst sorts of nepotistic abuses and 
that they contribute to society. 
A. How Markets Discipline Businesses 
In a family business, the concerns of family must be balanced against the 
demands of the marketplace. Properly harnessed, the discipline imposed by the 
marketplace provides a useful, if imperfect, mechanism for ensuring a sensible 
distribution of societal resources.98 The mechanism is imperfect because 
market outputs reflect inputs; if certain individuals or groups inherit 
unwarranted advantages, the state may be justified in undertaking 
redistributive measures.99 
 
 96 Harvey S. James Jr., What Can the Family Contribute to Business? Examining Contractual 
Relationships, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 61, 61 (1999). 
 97 See Michael Gilding, Families and Fortunes: Accumulation, Management Succession and Inheritance 
in Wealthy Families, 41 J. SOC. 29, 35–36 (2005). 
 98 Admittedly, the market mechanism leaves room for private benefits that do not contribute to general 
welfare. Competitive slack in some industries may enable firms to hire and overpay family employees who are 
less capable than other available workers. See, e.g., THOMAS MANN, BUDDENBROOKS: THE DECLINE OF A 
FAMILY 271 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans., The Modern Library 1952) (1924) (noting of the business owner’s 
brother, who had been hired as chief clerk despite reservations regarding his competence, “[u]nfortunately 
[his] zeal for commerce began to dwindle after his first week on the job, and even more decisively after his 
second”). 
 99 For the most important articulation of a contrary view, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA 230 (1974), arguing in response to John Rawl’s theory of justice that so long as a “set of holdings is 
properly generated, there is no argument for a more extensive state based upon distributive justice.” Nozick 
concedes, however, that redistribution may be required to rectify the continuing impact of previous injustices 
assuming “that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the 
(descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited 
from the injustices.” Id. at 231. In the United States, a legacy of mistreatment of native populations, slavery, 
segregation, and de jure discrimination ought to preclude any argument that the current distribution of wealth 
is sancrosanct. Thus, Nozick’s defense of the minimal state cannot be used to support the status quo of wealth 
inequality in the United States. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ESSAYS AND REVIEWS, 1959–2002, at 107, 114 
(2014) (reviewing NOZICK, supra) (contending that Nozick’s “theories do not, except in a very general and 
associative manner, offer any particular comfort to contemporary capitalism”). 
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Nevertheless, to the extent family owners internalize the consequences of 
their choices,100 they have a strong incentive to avoid unwise hiring and 
promotion decisions.101 Over time, market pressures may cause 
family-business enterprises to transition away from family control in order to 
raise capital or to benefit from highly skilled, professional management.102 In 
any case, only a small fraction of family firms survive long enough to count as 
dynasties, and, from the standpoint of social equality, “shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves in three generations”103 may be more of a blessing than a curse. 
In light of market constraints, it should be unsurprising that many family 
businesses adopt hiring policies that require family members to develop 
adequate credentials in terms of education and experience before consideration 
for a position with the family business. Likewise, a business might require new 
employees to start on the proverbial shop-room floor before moving into 
managerial positions.104 
In his novel, Gain,105 Richard Powers describes the implementation of a 
strict apprenticeship in a family-owned soap factory: 
 
 100 If a family-controlled business is publicly traded, there is a danger that the family will use its majority 
position to extract private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders. 
 101 On the other hand, family owners will want to avoid causing family dissension, and choices made to 
satisfy a family’s expectation of equitable treatment may create business problems. See Ivan S. Lansberg, 
Managing Human Resources in Family Firms: The Problem of Institutional Overlap, 12 ORGANIZATIONAL 
DYNAMICS 39, 41 (1983) (“Founders often find themselves in the difficult situation of having to choose 
between either hiring (or firing) an incompetent relative or breaking up their relationship with some part of the 
family.”). 
 102 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 335 
(1990) (arguing that continued family ownership harmed “British organizational capabilities” and led those 
firms to underperform when compared to American rivals). However, some scholars argue that family 
businesses, in a variety of settings, can outperform non-family businesses. See infra Part III.A. For present 
purposes, the answer is less important than the existence of a market mechanism capable of producing an 
answer. 
 103 George Stalk & Henry Foley, Avoid the Traps that Can Destroy Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 25 (citing “a familiar aphorism”). 
 104 See Galen Moore, Market Basket List: 11 Management Tips from ‘Artie T.,’ BOS. BUS. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 
8:25 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2013/10/arthur-t-demoulas-management-
style.html (“We do all of our promoting from within. We start out bagging groceries and shagging carriages 
and cutting boxes in the back room and doing the things you do in a supermarket—99 percent of our people 
come from within the ranks.” (quoting Market Basket CEO and third-generation family owner Arthur T. 
Demoulas)). 
 105 RICHARD POWERS, GAIN (1998) (tracing the fortunes of several generations of the fictional Clare 
family and the soap company that they establish as a private partnership, later incorporate, and eventually take 
public). 
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Though born to run the firm, Douglas Clare I came up through the 
ranks. While still a child, he cleaned and swept his father’s offices. 
Learning to write, he spent a year as a copyist. At thirteen, he drove a 
horse-drawn dray back and forth between Roxbury and the Boston 
docks. Later, he shoveled rosin at the factory for his uncle Resolve, 
eleven hours a day. . . .  
. . . . 
Douglas’s patrimony was never in doubt. But the distance he 
traveled, from shoveler to president, never failed to impress those he 
did business with. Inside the firm and out, he emanated an authority 
grounded on calluses.106 
Whether the heir apparent begins at the bottom, as in the fictional Clare Inc., or 
at a lower-level managerial position, familiarity with the business and 
establishment of merit seem essential as a precondition to effective 
leadership.107 
When the expectations of family life conflict with business needs, some 
accommodation must be reached if the business is to remain viable.108 In one 
case, an uncle’s dislike for his nephew undermined the potential for a smooth 
transition of control and led the nephew to found a competing business, taking 
with him key customers and employees.109 Ironically, a clearer commitment to 
continued family ownership might have saved the business by assuring the 
nephew that he would eventually assume control.110 Instead, the uncle warned 
his nephew that the nephew’s right to inherit the business would depend upon 
 
 106 Id. at 217–18. 
 107 See Moore, supra note 104 (describing how a CEO seemed to know each of his employees and also 
“knew intimate details of the 138,000-square-foot store—like the price of a special, the length of the chicken 
case . . . and the weekly revenue from a new kind of snack-food display piloted there”). As the CEO explained,  
Dad taught us, God rest his soul, my dad Mike Demoulas, you know, he carried a notebook and a 
pad of paper and a pencil, and you walk around the store—just what we’re going to do. We’re 
going to talk to customers, talk to our great associates here and make a note of things that happen 
and you follow up on it.  
Id. 
 108 See MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES, RANDEL S. CARLOCK & ELIZABETH FLORENT-TREACY, FAMILY 
BUSINESS ON THE COUCH: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (2007) (“Unresolved personal conflicts, lack of 
trust, difficult interpersonal relationships, sibling rivalry, generational issues, the family’s demands on the 
business—any or all of these issues can affect a family firm’s success.”). 
 109 See Hamburger v. Hamburger, No. 93-3359-E, 1995 WL 579679, at *1, *2 (Super. Ct., Mass. Sept. 29, 
1995); see also CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2010) (discussing Hamburger). 
 110 Moreover, as a matter of equity, the child who had done the work building the business would seem to 
have a legitimate claim as against outsiders, even meritorious outsiders. 
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whether the uncle or his brother, the nephew’s father, lived longer.111 
Evidently, the uncle intended to fire his nephew at the first opportunity, and the 
nephew’s incentives altered accordingly.112 
Market considerations also apply when a business transitions from one 
generation to the next because the older generation needs to find an economic 
exit strategy. If the business is to stay in the family, the capital demands of the 
retiring generation must be in keeping with what the business can afford to 
pay. There are, of course, many insurance and tax strategies for managing 
these transitions.113 For present purposes, it is enough to observe that continued 
family ownership is possible only if each generation can generate sufficient 
profits through the business for a succession strategy to work.114 
When a family falters, the markets will wrest control away, one way or 
another. For example, if a family business squanders its capital, it will need to 
obtain more, either by taking on debt or bringing in equity investors.115 In 
either case, the contributors of capital will take steps to protect their 
investment, thereby diminishing the benefits of family control.116 Unless there 
are barriers to entry that permit undue market power, kinship preferences 
within an organization do not preclude others from establishing competing 
firms: “[D]eveloping a business . . . may require only that one learn the 
relevant skill, obtain some capital, and find willing customers; no particular 
 
 111 See Hamburger, 1995 WL 579679, at *1. 
 112 See id. Note that a related issue can arise when the younger generation relies upon promises of 
inheritance, performing labor for a family business in order to achieve a future reward, only to find that the 
older relative has made other arrangements for the disposition of the estate. See Means, Contractual 
Foundation, supra note 8, at 721–22; see also HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A 
HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 150, 158 (2012) (noting that when an older person promised a 
younger person inheritance in exchange for services, but does not formally include the promise in a will, 
“when these young (or no longer young) persons sued for a compensation or a legacy that had not come . . . 
they would have detailed the work that had been required as the older person fell apart”). 
 113 Several tax provisions are also designed to “protect family businesses from forced sales.” Lily L. 
Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX. 
L. REV. 1, 57 (2009). 
 114 See, e.g., FEDERMAN, supra note 60, at 87 (“Contrary to what most people assume, I didn’t simply 
‘inherit’ Russ & Daughters. After years of working six days a week, ten hours a day, I earned the right to buy 
the business from the preceding generation of Russes.”). The parents “actually seemed relieved; they had no 
other exit plan.” Id. at 69. And, in turn, the third generation has sold the business to the fourth: “In the Russ 
family, every generation inherits the right to buy out the preceding generation.” Id. at 73. 
 115 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1667 (2006) (noting that for poorly managed businesses, 
“internally generated funds will be insufficient, requiring recourse to the capital market”). 
 116 Id. at 1677 (“[E]xternal suppliers of debt or equity can be expected to insist on a means to dissipate the 
controlling shareholder’s influence if poor performance threatens the new investment.”). 
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decision-maker or small set of decision-makers has authority over the question 
of who can pursue that path.”117 A business that fails to make room for outside 
talent may be forced to compete with it. 
B. The Competitiveness of Family Businesses 
Conventional wisdom once held that family businesses were nothing more 
than a faltering first step on the path toward professional management.118 In a 
family business, “policy and direction are subject to significant influence by 
one or more family units . . . through ownership and sometimes through the 
participation of family members in management.”119 In a non-family business, 
by contrast, the “managers and key decision makers come from the 
professional labor market rather than the family.”120 The distinction is often 
significant. Even though they are governed by the same formal legal rules, 
“[f]amily firms differ from nonfamily businesses in that the norms, principles, 
and obligations of the family overlap with those of the business.”121 
For several reasons, scholars have long considered family to be a relatively 
undesirable form of economic organization. First, when other stakeholders are 
involved, there is reason to worry that family owners will find ways to benefit 
from control, putting family interests ahead of the business.122 Second, if 
managerial leadership must be drawn from the family’s ranks, the talent pool 
may be too thin to replicate the successes of a first-generation entrepreneur.123 
Third, in seeking to placate family concerns, business leaders may fail to 
 
 117 FISHKIN, supra note 17, at 130.  
 118 See DAVID S. LANDES, DYNASTIES: FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE WORLD’S GREAT FAMILY 
BUSINESSES xii (2006) (“[T]he current economic orthodoxy sees family enterprise as inappropriate, 
ineffective, and essentially finished as a major economic engine.”). 
 119 Peter Davis, Realizing the Potential of the Family Business, 12 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 47, 47 
(1983).  
 120 James, supra note 96.  
 121 Id.; see also Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8, at 1210. 
 122 See Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect 
Firm Value?, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385, 387 (2005) (“The large shareholder may use its controlling position in the 
firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders.”). Where minority shareholders are 
concerned, the law constrains abuse of control, regardless of family ownership. See Benjamin Means, A 
Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 
97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217 (2009). 
 123 See Jon I. Martinez, Bernhard S. Stöhr & Bernardo F. Quiroga, Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Public Companies in Chile, 20 FAM. BUS. REV. 83, 93 (2007) (arguing that 
managerial professionalization helps family firms to achieve success). 
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maximize profits.124 Finally, if a family ethos becomes associated with a 
particular way of doing business, the family may find it difficult to innovate.125 
However, recent empirical investigations suggest that these concerns are 
overstated and often invalid: “Much research concludes that family businesses 
not only last longer, but drive greater profits than their non-family 
counterparts.”126 Studies have shown that family ownership can produce 
significant value, especially in founder-managed companies.127 If family 
members are loyal to each other and appreciative of the business, they may 
work harder and take a flexible view of their role, contributing financial and 
human resources where needed.128 From an early age, family members have an 
opportunity to learn how the business works and to develop expertise that an 
outside manager could not hope to match.129 Thus, a business embedded in a 
family system can leverage family support to lower the cost of capital and 
labor, thereby producing goods and services more efficiently.130 Also, in 
industries where personal connections matter, there is often no effective 
substitute for the credibility that family ownership provides. Family businesses 
may seek to capitalize on their perceived virtues, advertising family 
stewardship as a signal of quality and trustworthiness.131 Finally, family-owned 
 
 124 See Lansberg, supra note 101, at 41. 
 125 See Sharon Belenzon, Andrea Patacconi & Rebecca Zarutskie, Married to the Firm? A Large Scale 
Investigation of the Social Context of Ownership, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2), 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~sb135/bio/Family%20Final%20with%20Names%20August%202015.pdf 
(“Lone owners, or owners with no affective ties to other shareholders, may be more willing to take on risk and 
adopt strategies of growth. By contrast, family owners, through repeated interactions and exposure to each 
other’s needs, may come to perceive themselves as ‘family nurturers’. They may want the firm to generate 
stable, secure income to family members, and preserve family control.” (citations omitted)).  
 126 AMY SCHUMAN, STACY STUTZ & JOHN L. WARD, FAMILY BUSINESS AS PARADOX 2 (2010). 
 127 See, e.g., Villalonga & Amit, supra note 122, at 387–88. 
 128 Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8, at 1190–91. 
 129 See Khai Sheang Lee, Guan Hua Lim & Wei Shi Lim, Note, Family Business Succession: 
Appropriation Risk and Choice of Successor, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 657, 658 (2003) (noting that family 
businesses often depend on “personal business contacts and networks” that an outsider to the business will 
have difficulty accessing). 
 130 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
232 (1991) (“[I]f family-owned ventures reduce the agency costs of management, there will be gains for all to 
share.”). 
 131 See Isabel C. Botero et al., Understanding Multiple Family Firm Identities: An Exploration of the 
Communicated Identity in Official Websites, 4 J. FAM. BUS. STRATEGY 12, 13 (2013); Marylyn Carrigan & 
Joan Buckley, ‘What’s So Special About Family Business?’ An Exploratory Study of UK and Irish Consumer 
Experiences of Family Businesses, 32 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 656, 657 (2008); Ulrich R. Orth & Mark T. 
Green, Consumer Loyalty to Family Versus Non-Family Business: The Roles of Store Image, Trust and 
Satisfaction, 16 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 248, 251 (2009). 
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firms may take a longer view of success than their peers, avoiding a 
counterproductive focus on quarterly returns.132 
The sheer prevalence of family businesses should count as some evidence 
of their fitness. Otherwise, the continuation of a defective, fundamentally 
flawed institution would be hard to explain, at least in a society that has stable 
legal and market institutions to support business dealings among strangers as 
well as kin.133 In such a legal environment, kinship-based business 
arrangements are a choice rather than a necessity. From the standpoint of 
economically rational choice, an investment in a family business makes sense 
only if other available investments do not present a better value.134 
Admittedly, some of the claims made in favor of the competitiveness of 
family firms have been too anecdotal. Even if family businesses outperform 
their peers, as a general proposition, it is still important to understand whether 
family attributes matter and, if so, in what contexts and in what ways.135 
Analytic methodologies vary, in part, because family businesses have been 
studied by “[s]cholars trained in psychology, sociology, law, accounting, 
economics, organizational behavior, strategic management, entrepreneurship, 
and numerous other disciplines.”136 More recent studies have begun to address 
these methodological concerns, for instance by distinguishing public 
corporations from smaller, closely held businesses.137 In sum, not only are 
 
 132 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE ENDURING VALUE OF VALUES 
85 (2014) (describing how the legendary investor Warren Buffet likes to acquire family businesses whose 
owners have adopted a long-term perspective). 
 133 See BELLOW, supra note 57, at 469 (“[W]hile nepotism may indeed shelter some incompetent family 
members from the consequences of their failures, the record of family contributions to the history of capitalism 
has been overwhelmingly positive. If this hadn’t been true, the American economy would be a basket case 
instead of a thriving engine of prosperity.”). 
 134 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 130, at 231 (“Each organizational form presents its own 
problems, for which people have designed different mechanisms of control. At the margin the problems must 
be equally severe, the mechanisms equally effective—were it otherwise, investors would transfer their money 
from one form to the other until the marginal equality condition was satisfied.”). 
 135 See Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for Assessing the 
Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1, 5–6 (1999) (arguing that “generalizations beg 
certain questions—for instance, What family firms have advantages and when? How long do these advantages 
endure? Are they the result of internal or external factors? Under what conditions do family firms have an 
advantage?”). 
 136 Id. at 1. 
 137 See, e.g., Danny Miller, Isabelle Le Brenton-Miller & Barry Scholnick, Stewardship v. Stagnation: An 
Empirical Comparison of Small Family and Non-Family Businesses, 45 J. MGMT. STUD. 51, 52 (2008) 
(observing that concerns about family-firm performance have often involved studies of public corporations to 
the exclusion of “more representative [family-owned businesses] in which there are multiple family members 
involved in owning and running the business, and where family ownership is complete or dominant”). 
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family businesses “the dominant form of organization in the world,” but 
“largely negative portrayals” of their performance “do not seem to hold up.”138 
Instead, “recent research . . . shows [family-owned businesses] to outperform 
and out-survive most companies.”139 
To the extent family businesses contribute to aggregate social welfare by 
boosting economic productivity, creating jobs and benefiting consumers, 
legitimate worries about the distributive implications of family businesses 
should take into account their economic value. As discussed in the next 
section, the relevance of a market test depends upon whether the markets in 
question are fully competitive. 
C. Regulating Markets 
Markets depend upon legal rules to function properly. At the most basic 
level that means a reliable method of identifying property rights and a court 
system capable of enforcing contractual claims. In addition, as this section 
describes, competitive markets may depend upon the regulatory structure of 
securities law, antitrust law, and licensing provisions. In some cases, legal 
rules can undermine market competition, and this section identifies potential 
problem areas involving family businesses, including protectionist set-asides 
for particular industries and tax exemptions for intra-family transfers. 
1. Protecting Competition 
The competitive environment family businesses must negotiate depends 
upon a number of overlapping bodies of business law. Taken together, 
securities law, antitrust law, and, where applicable, licensing regulations, limit 
the ability of family business owners to preserve economic advantages without 
facing effective competition. 
Securities Law. A well-developed market for corporate securities can 
provide an important test of the competitiveness of family-owned businesses. 
Even if a family business itself avoids the capital markets, it must be prepared 
to compete with other firms that will access public capital to grow.140 Thus, 
 
 138 Id. at 73. 
 139 Id. 
 140 For example, to the extent public firms have a lower cost of capital, they have a competitive advantage 
that must be outweighed by other benefits of private control. See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, Insider Ownership and 
the Decision to Go Public, 62 REV. ECON. STUDIES 425, 425–26 (1995) (noting that “less costly access to the 
capital market” is one of the traditional justifications for taking a private company public). 
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one author argues that “characteristics of the stock market help to explain how 
German and U.S. corporate experience began to diverge at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.”141 German law responded to an agrarian movement 
resentful of modern capitalism by restricting securities trading; meanwhile, the 
U.S. began to develop “a securities culture.”142 The result was that German 
companies relied upon bank financing more than equity markets.143 By the 
time the German stock market rules were liberalized, “the damage had been 
done.”144 Instead of using markets to allocate resources efficiently, 
“[i]nstitutional arrangements, syndicate agreements, and cartels had been 
deployed to reorganize German business and had set it on a path where the 
capital market mattered less.”145 In an environment of business cooperation 
among a relatively small set of players, family continuity could be more 
important than efficiency.146 Consequently, the prevalence of family-owned 
businesses in Germany may be explained by something other than their 
competitiveness.147 
Antitrust Law. Laws designed to curb market power also have a role to play 
in protecting competition so as to test the fitness of family firms. That is, 
anti-collusion rules facilitate competition and therefore make close-knit, 
familial relationships among capitalists less important. Once again, Germany 
provides an interesting counter-example. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, “German firms in the great industries began to work out sophisticated 
ways to cooperate in maintaining market share and profits.”148 While U.S. 
firms had to comply with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade” and any 
“monopoliz[ation], attempt[ed] . . . monopoliz[ation], or combin[ation] or 
conspir[acy] . . . to monopolize,”149 German firms faced no such constraint.150 
Accordingly, “whereas the American story illustrated the emergence of 
 
 141 HAROLD JAMES, FAMILY CAPITALISM 117 (2006). 
 142 Id. at 118. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 500–01 (arguing that large, industrial “German firms differed from 
the American in that the family often continued to have a powerful, even a decisive, say in management”). 
 147 Of course, the history of German corporate law cannot be summarized in a paragraph. For a more 
detailed review, see Peter Muchlinski, The Development of German Corporate Law to 1990: An Historical 
Reappraisal, 14 GERMAN L.J. 339 (2013). 
 148 CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 501. 
 149 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).  
 150 CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 501 (“[A]greements between firms as to price, production, and markets 
were legally enforceable in courts of law . . . .”). 
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competitive managerial capitalism, the German story exemplifies the coming 
of cooperative managerial capitalism.”151 Although family ownership declined 
somewhat by the end of the twentieth century, it was still “a significant force” 
and revealed “the persistence of family ownership in Germany and the impact 
it has had on accumulated wealth.”152 
Entry Requirements. In addition to legal rules that structure markets, 
industry-specific licensing requirements create an external merit filter 
regardless of the family’s own predilections. For instance, children can 
practice law with a family law firm only if they attain the qualifications 
necessary for admission to law school, graduate in good standing, pass the 
state’s bar examination, and receive and maintain a license from the state. The 
same could be said of accounting, medicine, and other professions subject to 
licensing requirements. In certain sub-specialties—say, neurosurgery—the 
merit filter may be so stringent that family connections among practitioners 
become more a matter of curiosity than legitimate concern.153 
2. Market-Insulating Rules 
Sometimes the law structures markets in ways that seem to undercut the 
competitive pressures that would otherwise require family businesses to create 
value in order to survive. Market exceptions may be justified on other grounds, 
but, as this section shows, the slackening of market constraints necessarily 
 
 151 Id. 
 152 Caroline Fohlin, The History of Corporate Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 
235, 236 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (noting that nearly all of the largest German fortunes “derive from 
family-founded enterprises”). 
 153 Of course, licensing requirements create artificial barriers to entry and some argue that informed 
consumers can make better choices for themselves as to whether to use the provider of a particular service. 
Even if licensing can help markets to function better by ensuring minimum standards, incumbent businesses 
have reason to lobby for licensing rules in order to limit competition—in which case, licensing rules could 
squelch entrepreneurship and create some of the problems that the antitrust rules were designed to prevent. For 
example, the Institute for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship at the University of Chicago Law School has 
advocated on behalf of food truck vendors whose business is inhibited by regulations that, arguably, do more 
to insulate established restaurants from competition than to protect public health. See Alex Levine & Beth 
Kregor, IJ Clinic’s Beth Kregor’s Testimony About Proposed Amendments to Chicago Food Truck Legislation, 
U. CHI. L. SCH. (July 20, 2012), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/ij-clinics-beth-kregors-testimony-about-
proposed-amendments-chicago-food-truck-legislation. 
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reduces our confidence in family businesses and increases our concern that 
family-business wealth may simply reinforce existing inequalities.154 
Protectionism. The most straightforward examples of market-insulating 
rules are those that involve the exemption of family businesses from ordinary 
competition. For example, in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot 
Commissioners, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana state law that allowed 
river pilots to restrict access to the profession to relatives and, occasionally, 
friends.155 
In Kotch, the plaintiffs brought an equal protection challenge to Louisiana’s 
requirement that pilots serve a six-month apprenticeship with a current pilot to 
receive a certification to pilot seagoing vessels along the stretch of Mississippi 
river that leads to the port of New Orleans.156 Although the river boat pilots 
almost always restricted apprenticeships to kin, the Court noted that the 
“history and practice of pilotage demonstrate that . . . it is also a highly 
personalized calling.”157 While acknowledging the nepotism at issue,158 the 
Court was unwilling to declare the practice unconstitutional.159 Even the Kotch 
dissent conceded the value of a family business culture while concluding that it 
violates equal protection for “blood” to be made “the crux of selection.”160 
 
 154 Cf. Gilson, supra note 115, at 1674 (arguing in the context of inefficient controlling shareholder 
structures that when markets do not perform their role, there is reason to alter “legal rules and supporting 
institutions to increase the exposure of control to the market”). 
 155 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947). 
 156 Id. at 558 (“The pilot’s job generally requires that he go outside the harbor’s entrance in a small boat to 
meet incoming ships, board them and direct their course from open water to the port. The same service is 
performed for vessels leaving the port. Pilots are thus indispensable cogs in the transportation system of every 
maritime economy.”). 
 157 Id. (“A pilot does not require a formalized technical education so much as a detailed and extremely 
intimate, almost intuitive, knowledge of the weather, waterways and conformation of the harbor or river which 
he serves.”); see also MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI (Bos., James R. Osgood & Co. 1883). 
 158 Id. at 562 (“Probably in pilotage more than in any other occupation in the United States the male 
members of a family follow the same work from generation to generation.” (quoting DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
SPECIAL AGENTS SERIES, PILOTAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1917)). 
 159 See id. at 564. 
 160 Id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Conceivably the familial system would be the most effective 
possible scheme for training many kinds of artisans . . . from the viewpoint of securing the highest degree of 
skill and competence.”). Later courts have distinguished the unique setting of river pilots and have found that 
similar restrictions are without rational basis and therefore unlawful. See, e.g., Backlund v. Hessen, 104 F.3d 
1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Minnesota fire department violated the Constitution’s requirement of 
equal protection by failing to hire the best-qualified applicant in order to hire relatives of current department 
employees). 
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Whether the Supreme Court was correct that Louisiana had a rational basis 
for believing that nepotism protected the quality of its river pilots, the Court’s 
holding ensured that the insularity of the profession would continue regardless 
of the truth of that assumption. Also, the nostalgia for family-business 
ownership seems misplaced because of the heavy involvement of the state in 
regulating the relevant market. In an industry dependent upon public regulation 
to create a demand for its services, to set fees, and to forestall outside 
competition, there is no way to know whether the river pilots offer a value 
commensurate with what they are paid.161 Moreover, when the law permits 
families to erect barriers to entry, as in the case of the Louisiana river pilots, 
worries about the distributional consequences of kinship preferences are 
heightened. 
Likewise, there is reason to worry about corporate farming restrictions 
enacted in nine states that have limited the ownership of agricultural land to 
closely held entities and that specially privilege family ownership.162 
According to one commentator, such laws leave “the food consumer . . . 
vulnerable to the political machinations of agrarian interest groups.”163 The 
restrictions could be justified if family businesses are intrinsically valuable and 
merit extra protection: “[A] large corporation operating without any local 
owners in a given area may care less about costs it imposes on neighbors in the 
form of, for example, environmental damage, than firms that are locally owned 
and operated.”164 Again, however, the assumed benefits are locked in by 
legislation and no longer open to market verification—for instance whether 
consumers are willing to pay more for the benefit of a family-owned brand.165 
 
 161 Interestingly, one commentator notes that traffic in the New Orleans port has declined sharply since 
2008, a decline largely explained by price competition from other ports. The political power of the river pilots 
and the lack of direct competition for setting prices may have led to overreaching and, perhaps, a political 
correction driven by a broader market impact. See Jeffrey Kenneth Prattini, Comment, Louisiana’s 2004 River 
Pilot Reform Muddies the Water, 52 LOY. L. REV. 369 (2006). 
 162 See Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
97, 98 (2009). The nature of the family preference varies from state to state. See id. at 112 & n.52 (citing IOWA 
CODE § 9H.1(8)(a) (2007) (requiring that family hold majority of stock)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 951(A)(1), (A)(3) (2012) (creating exception to ten shareholder maximum for family members). 
 163 Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 877 (1995) (arguing that “[a]grarian 
self-dealing” harms the stability of agricultural farming). 
 164 Schutz, supra note 162, at 101. 
 165 It is possible that market failures make it difficult to price the intangible benefits of community or that 
these values lie outside the market and are worth pursuing. Ultimately, the agricultural laws might be justified, 
but they have a cost, which is the diminished incentive for family farms to ensure that kinship preferences are 
defensible on the merits. 
MEANS GALLEYSPROOFS2 4/18/2016 2:18 PM 
2016] WEALTH INEQUALITY 967 
The Trust-Fund Loophole. When business founders receive compensation 
in the form of stock, they can structure the investment to defer taxation on 
capital gains until the business is sold.166 However, if a founder leaves her 
stock to heirs rather than selling it, the transfer is subject to a large estate-tax 
exemption. Furthermore, the heirs are not obligated to pay taxes when they 
receive the stock. Even if the heirs sell the stock later, they can exclude any 
appreciation of value that occurred between the time of the founder’s initial 
investment and her death—the stock transfers to the heirs at a “stepped-up” 
basis and only further appreciation, if any, is subject to a capital gains tax.167 
Hypothetically, if a founder turned a $100,000 investment into a $100,000,000 
company, almost none of that appreciation would ever be taxed.168 This is not a 
small matter: “Founders’ stock—not high executive salaries and bonuses—
accounts for a significant part of the growing inequality of wealth in the United 
States.”169 
As Professor Fleischer explained recently, defending President Obama’s 
plan to subject inherited wealth to taxation, 
The White House proposal is . . . efficient. . . . By taking away the 
largest incentive to hold on to appreciated assets—the step up in basis 
at death—the proposal significantly reduces the lock in effect and 
will improve economic efficiency. In other words, if Junior is not the 
best person to run the business, taxing the founder’s gains at death 
will make him more likely to sell the business earlier to someone who 
is.170 
Some exemptions might nevertheless be warranted to protect the family 
owners of smaller-scale businesses from incurring an unmanageable tax burden 
at a time—succession of ownership—that is already highly stressful. However, 
 
 166 Fleischer, supra note 71, at 62. For an explanation of how ordinary income can be transformed into 
capital gains, see id. at 64. 
 167 For an explanation of stepped-up basis, and a critique of the practice in the context of accrued capital 
gains, see generally Philip E. Heckerling, The Death of the “Stepped-Up” Basis at Death, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 
247 (1964). 
 168 Id. at 66 (“As it stands, this entrepreneurial wealth is taxed at a low rate or not at all, allowing founders 
to leave behind a legacy of dynastic wealth subject only to the rather dodgy application of the estate tax.”). 
 169 Id. at 64. 
 170 Victor Fleischer, Echoes of Piketty in Obama Proposal to Address Income Inequality, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 20, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/echoes-of-piketty-in-obama-proposal-to-
address-income-inequality/. But see Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 910 (2003) (defending 
tax rules as subsidy for high-tech investment). 
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the continuation of a family business should reflect something other than tax 
arbitrage. 
Dual-Class Stock. Controversy regarding the use of dual-class stock 
provides another example of legal rules that limit the corrective power of 
markets.171 In a typical dual-class stock scenario, founders reserve to 
themselves a class of stock with enhanced voting rights, ensuring that the 
founders will always be able to outvote public shareholders.172 Although not 
mandated by law, the practice is authorized by state statutes that set the 
permissible boundaries for stock classification and by national stock exchanges 
that permit listed firms to have a dual-stock structure.173 
Dual-class stock is commonly employed in family-owned businesses that 
have non-family equity investors174 but has also been adopted in recent public 
stock offerings by major high-technology companies including Facebook and 
Google.175 Because the founders reserve the voting power, among other things, 
to shut down any unwanted offer to buy the business, the market for corporate 
control cannot serve as a check on value-diminishing choices that may serve 
the private interests of the controlling family at the expense of other 
investors.176 Nor can shareholders remove directors should the business 
 
 171 See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Senator Elizabeth Warren Urges NYSE, NASDAQ 
to Propose Rules Requiring “One Share, One Vote” Structures (June 5, 2013), http://www.warren.senate.gov/ 
?p=press_release&id=145 (“If a company goes to the public markets to raise money, long-term ordinary 
common stock investors—a category that includes directly or indirectly millions of retirees and workers—
should be entitled to certain basic rights . . . . One of the most basic of those rights is one-share-one-vote.”); 
see also Paul Lee, Note, Protecting Public Shareholders: The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (2015) (describing efforts by institutional investors to force change, either by 
refusing to invest in companies with dual-listed stock or by lobbying the stock exchanges to exclude such 
companies). Legal academics have long debated the appropriateness of dual-class stock. See, e.g., Joel 
Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 688 (1986) (arguing that “disproportionate voting common stock is the corporate 
law equivalent to price-fixing”). 
 172 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder 
Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). Thus, insiders have voting rights that exceed their cash-flow rights. See 
Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the 
United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010). 
 173 Gordon, supra note 172, at 5, 8, 64, 66. 
 174 See, e.g., Gompers et al., supra note 172, at 1059, 1063. 
 175 John Letzing, Facebook Puts Dual-Class Stock Structure in Place, WALL ST. J.: MARKETWATCH 
(Nov. 24, 2009, 4:26 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebook-adopts-dual-class-stock-structure-
2009-11-24.  
 176 In dual stock forms, the market no longer provides any separate assurances that a corporation is well 
governed. As such, the important of good governance is heightened. See Deborah A. DeMott, Guests at the 
Table?: Independent Directors in Family-Influenced Public Companies, 33 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (2008) 
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underperform market expectations. As one commentator observes, “The 
market for corporate control can force a widely held firm to internalize change; 
nothing plays a similar role in a controlling shareholder regime save the market 
mechanism.”177 
In theory, non-family investors price in the potential costs of 
value-reducing choices family owners might make and cannot be heard to 
complain when founders use the control they have bargained for. At the same 
time, if the justification for dual-class stock is that it insulates a public 
corporation from short-term market pressures, enabling the corporation to 
behave more like a family-owned venture, it should be noted that the economic 
circumstances are not identical. In particular, the family does not fully 
internalize the costs of decisions that harm the business while benefiting the 
family’s private interests. Costs to the business are socialized among all 
investors, while the family enjoys the benefits. Kinship preferences may still 
provide value in businesses that also use a dual-stock structure, but the market 
context gives us less confidence that the family has the right incentives to 
make sure this is so.178 
Religious Exemptions. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that three closely held family businesses could claim protection 
under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) because of the 
religious scruples of their family owners, even though the businesses had been 
organized as for-profit corporations.179 The Court concluded that “Congress 
did not discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to run their 
businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious 
beliefs.”180 The scope of the Court’s ruling remains unclear, but it is difficult to 
imagine circumstances in which a public corporation with a diverse set of 
shareholders could plausibly assert an objection based on religious identity.181 
 
(“Transactions in control occur only through processes of negotiation and consent, which heightens the 
importance of governance mechanisms that operate within dual-class firms.”). 
 177 Gilson, supra note 115, at 1678. 
 178 For discussion of possible solutions to the dual-stock issue, see id. at 1673–78. 
 179 See 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). The Court did not state explicitly whether other kinds of for-profit 
corporations might be eligible under RFRA. 
 180 Id. The Court observed that “[a] corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to 
achieve desired ends.” Id. at 2768. However, since corporations have a separate existence at law and individual 
shareholders are not ordinarily exposed to liability for the debts of the corporation, it is not clear why the Court 
thought that the corporate artifice should be ignored in this context but not others. 
 181 Id. at 2774 (“These cases . . . do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems unlikely 
that . . . corporate giants . . . will often assert RFRA claims.”). The ambiguity of the Court’s ruling has led a 
number of conflicting suggested interpretations. See, e.g., Letter from Katherine Franke et al. to the Ctrs. for 
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Therefore, the Hobby Lobby precedent seems to provide special competitive 
advantages to closely held businesses owned by religiously observant families 
because those businesses can assert a religious objection to compliance with 
costly regulations if the regulations encroach upon the families’ sincerely held 
religious beliefs.182 
As the preceding analysis illustrates, the presence or absence of market 
constraints matters; when multi-generational family businesses succeed in a 
competitive market, concerns about inequality may be muted, not because the 
family heirs fully deserve their advantages, but because the family’s wealth 
can be tied to measurable, ongoing achievement.183 In this regard, it is notable 
that family-business dynasties are rare and even great fortunes dissipate.184 
Indeed, the well-known pitfalls of family succession pose a challenge that 
motivates a prodigious academic literature focused on the management of 
family-owned businesses.185 From a different perspective, though, the limited 
lifespan of most family businesses may be a feature rather than a bug. If 
 
Medicare and Medicaid Servs. (Oct. 21, 2014), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on_proposed_regs_corp_law_profs_for_submission.pdf (arguing that “the 
close ties between family members who share a religious faith and operate a religiously-influenced business 
are the best assurance of the close nexus on which religious rights depend”) (citing Means, Nonmarket Values, 
supra note 8, at 1193–94). For a more expansive interpretation of the Court’s ruling, see Lyman Johnson & 
David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10, 23 (2014–2015) (arguing that state 
corporate law does not require corporations to maximize profits and provides ample room to select other 
purposes, including the exercise of religion). 
 182 The extent of the advantage would depend upon the costs associated with the objectionable regulation 
or regulations. 
 183 To be clear, this is more (and less) than a utilitarian justification for inequality and does not proceed 
from any such foundational commitment. It involves, rather, a kind of social judgment, in which the success of 
a family business may generate respect for the work ethic and values of the owners, and, perhaps, a desire to 
emulate their accomplishments. It may also be the case that successful family businesses contribute more to 
general welfare than could be achieved through a more egalitarian distribution of resources, but the success of 
a particular business cannot prove as a matter of formal calculation that no alternative mode of distribution 
would have produced more value, all things considered. 
 184 For instance, one commentator repeats “[t]he lament of the ancient Jewish retailer”: “The first 
generation founds the business, the second generation builds the business, and the third generation kills the 
business.” FEDERMAN, supra note 60, at 199. In any case, the relatively small number of family-owned 
mega-firms have little to do with the local “bakeries and barbecue joints, funeral homes and furniture builders, 
cheesemakers, fishermen, [and] ferry boat drivers” that may be more typical of family enterprise. See COREY, 
supra note 61 (book jacket). 
 185 See FRED NEUBAUER & ALDEN G. LANK, THE FAMILY BUSINESS: ITS GOVERNANCE FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY 17 (1998) (stating that problems in “managing the process of ownership and management 
succession” are “the single most important reason for the fragility of family enterprises”). 
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unfortunate for the families involved, business failures can be viewed, 
ecumenically, as an appropriate limitation of inequality.186 
III. FAMILY VALUES 
The problem of wealth inequality is not that some people have more money 
than others, even if by many orders of magnitude.187 Rather, there is a growing 
consensus across the political spectrum that inequality deserves serious 
attention because of its impact on opportunities.188 In today’s society, it is 
unrealistic to suppose that someone born into poverty will have a fair chance at 
success in life.189 Without a ladder of opportunity, whether provided by the 
state or cobbled together by families and communities, many members of 
society will continue to be trapped by the circumstances of their birth.190 In 
order to succeed, individuals and families need stable economic circumstances, 
access to education, and support networks.191 Those who cannot save money or 
 
 186 See, e.g., Kerry A. Dolan, How to Blow $9 Billion: The Fallen Stroh Family, FORBES (July 8, 2014, 
8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2014/07/08/how-the-stroh-family-lost-the-largest-private-
beer-fortune-in-the-u-s/ (reporting that although the company was once the third largest brewer in the U.S., 
“today the Strohs, as a family business or even a collective financial entity, have essentially ceased to exist. 
The company has been sold for parts. The Stroh Companies has doled out its last dividends to shareholders. 
The last remaining family entity owns a half-empty office building in Detroit. While there was enough cash 
flowing for enough years that the fifth generation Strohs still seem pretty comfortable, the family looks 
destined to go shirtsleeves-to-shirtsleeves in six”). In short, “[h]ard as it is to build a family business designed 
to last in perpetuity, it’s shockingly easy for any successor to tank it.” Id. 
 187 See Jedediah S. Purdy, Wealth and Democracy, NOMOS (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641121 (“Inequality, as a merely formal or statistical 
feature of the economy, is not good or bad; it becomes good or bad only as it affects those things that people 
value and have reason to value.”). 
 188 See Amy Chozick, Economic Plan Is a Quandary for Hillary Clinton’s Campaign, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/us/politics/economic-plan-is-a-quandary-for-hillary-
clintons-campaign.html (“The debate [over income inequality] is extending beyond the Democratic Party as 
Republicans wade into the issues. ‘If Americans are working harder than ever, earning less than they once did, 
our government and our leaders should step up, offer a plan, fix what’s wrong,’ former Gov. Jeb Bush of 
Florida said in a speech in Detroit last week as he laid the groundwork for his potential 2016 candidacy.”). 
 189 See Gary R. Solon, Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 
403–04 (1992) (discussing how empirical evidence suggests that America has a “dramatically less mobile 
society” than what previous studies had previously concluded). 
 190 See Mankiw, supra note 33, at 24 (“Equality of opportunity is often viewed as a social goal in itself, 
but economists recognize that failure to achieve such equality would normally lead to inefficiency as well. If 
some individuals are precluded from pursuing certain paths in life, then they might be unable to contribute 
fully to growing the economic pie.”). 
 191 See id. at 24–25 (“[I]f children from poor families are unable to continue their education because of 
financial constraints, they do not accumulate the optimal amount of human capital.”). 
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insure against risks cannot afford to take entrepreneurial risks, let alone defer 
income long enough to earn a professional degree.192 
As this Article has already argued, when the state fails to invest adequately 
in social mobility, family businesses offer a second-best solution by enabling a 
family to advance the interests of its members over multiple generations, 
thereby breaking down an exclusionary class structure. However, private 
entrepreneurship and public support should not be perceived as binary 
alternatives. Rather, we should recognize that the structure of opportunity 
depends upon the interrelationship of three institutions: the family, the market, 
and the state. For example, food stamp programs that strengthen the social 
safety net can also provide the conditions necessary for business 
entrepreneurship that, in the long run, lifts individuals and families out of 
poverty.193 The mechanisms may be complementary. 
This Part focuses on the distinctive role families can play in broadening the 
distribution of wealth and opportunities. In some respects, family businesses 
offer an attractive vision of capitalism. A family’s commitment to a business 
enterprise can reinforce family relationships, as family members work together 
to achieve a shared vision.194 Consequently, family businesses are notably 
resilient; family owners have reason to invest resources during hard times 
when investors with a less personal investment would walk away.195 
Sometimes, these investments follow from a view that the biological family is 
part of a broader economic family that includes various other stakeholders.196 
 
 192 See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 839 (2001) (noting that 
an “inability to invest in human capital traps many families in intergenerational poverty, thus slowing the 
nation’s economic growth”). 
 193 See Carmen Nobel, Food Stamp Entrepreneurs: How Public Assistance Enables Business 
Bootstrapping, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 2, 2014), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/7589. 
html (interviewing Professor Gareth Olds regarding his empirical research into food stamp programs and his 
own parents’ experience using public assistance to form a business). 
 194 See, e.g., COREY, supra note 61, at 5 (documenting multi-generation family businesses in Wisconsin). 
 195 See BETH MACY, FACTORY MAN: HOW ONE FURNITURE MAKER BATTLED OFFSHORING, STAYED 
LOCAL—AND HELPED SAVE AN AMERICAN TOWN (2014) (reporting efforts of third-generation family owner to 
preserve business and hundreds of jobs); Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility 
After Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 973, 977 (2012) (“Businesses are economic enterprises situated in a 
broader web of social networks. When business owners live where their customers live, these social networks 
strengthen as business ties overlap with other networks (school, church, recreation) that together form the 
fabric of place.”). 
 196 See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on 
Corporate Governance, CAL. MGT. REV., Spring 1983, at 88, 89; Katharine Q. Seelye, Across a Grocery 
Chain, a Labor Protest in Support of a Manager, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
07/19/us/across-a-grocery-chain-a-labor-protest-in-support-of-a-manager.html (interviewing employees in 
connection with family-business dispute involving control of the Market Basket supermarket chain and the 
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Just as public safety nets create economic stability, family businesses can do 
much the same, helping members of a community accumulate wealth and 
provide opportunities for their children.197 
On the other hand, family businesses are vulnerable to family dysfunction. 
Irrational feuds can destroy businesses that would otherwise enjoy an enviable 
market position. In the long run, the market should correct business failures 
caused by family disputes. Other competitors will emerge and thrive. However, 
for the families and other stakeholders involved in a needless business failure, 
the disruptions can be considerable. Moreover, there can be no guarantee that 
the values a family business seeks to advance will promote social equality. 
Family owners have tremendous power over the lives of their employees.198 
Whether driven by discriminatory animus or parochial religious conviction, 
family owners can exercise that power to impose their values on others. 
A. Potential Social Benefits 
Family businesses have social significance and are more than just a vehicle 
for transferring family wealth across generations. They can affect social 
welfare by facilitating economic growth, distributing wealth more widely than 
would otherwise be the case, and by serving as “a model for creative, humane 
capitalism.”199 To the extent this is true, the involvement of multiple 
generations of a single family in the ownership and operation of a business 
offers social benefits that ought to be accounted for in any comprehensive 
assessment of wealth inequality.200 
 
removal of Arthur T. Demoulas, a third-generation family owner, from his role as president: 
“Several . . . employees spoke of Arthur T.’s generosity and compassion. ‘He’s been to my kids’ weddings, my 
mother’s funeral, his sisters came to my mother’s funeral, to my brother-in-law’s funeral,’ said Michael King, 
57, the company’s controller”). For further discussion of the Market Basket dispute, see infra Part IV. 
 197 See, e.g., Tom Moroney, A Year After Upheaval, Market Basket Looks Stronger than Ever, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 31, 2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.tablet.telegram.com/article/20150731/NEWS/ 
150739818 (“‘[Arthur T. Demoulas, the family-business CEO] gives more than you put in,’ said Sean Morse, 
45, assistant manager at the Market Basket in Londonderry, New Hampshire. ‘He wants us all to have a better 
life. I can take care of my family, they’re healthy and it’s all because of him.’”). 
 198 See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the distinction between an independent contractor and an employee turns 
largely on the extent to which the worker must accommodate herself to a schedule and terms set by the 
business owner). 
 199 Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8, at 1191. 
 200 The concentration of economic resources in a single family may still be undesirable, from the 
standpoint of wealth inequality, but that conclusion should follow from a full consideration of the pros and 
cons of family business ownership. See Purdy, supra note 187 (manuscript at 2) (“To diagnose unequal 
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1. Reinforcing Kinship Ties 
Family businesses often have special meaning for their family owners.201 
Just as we may respect the commitment to service of a fourth- or 
fifth-generation police officer or soldier, there is something ennobling about a 
new generation willing to take over a family business, even though 
higher-paying jobs might have been available elsewhere.202 For example, one 
family-business owner left the practice of law at a major New York law firm to 
run his family’s Lower East Side smoked fish establishment.203 By continuing 
the family enterprise, family members embrace their own heritage and find 
meaning in commercial activity.204 
In order for the younger generation to make such a commitment, the older 
generation must first take pains to build something worthy of the commitment. 
Although kinship preferences might be viewed as selfish from the perspective 
of those who do not benefit, the continuation of a family enterprise can also be 
characterized as an expression of generosity: 
To the extent that nepotism takes place in the context of a family 
enterprise . . . the spirit of it requires that its benefits be passed on to 
the next generation. We therefore express our gratitude to our parents 
in the form of generosity to our own children. This view of life as a 
multigenerational project was very apparent to our immigrant 
forebears.205 
 
wealth . . . one must disaggregate its effects and relate them to a scheme of values and the institutions that 
embody those values . . . .”). 
 201 The non-pecuniary benefits of ownership can sometimes explain the desire to maintain family control. 
See Gilson, supra note 115, at 1666 (“[O]ne would expect to find controlling shareholders in major newspaper 
companies because running a major national newspaper puts one at the center of major public and cultural 
issues, with the potential to influence the outcome.”). 
 202 See generally BELLOW, supra note 57, at 16 (“Because we live in what might be called a ‘postkinship’ 
society, we have forgotten what we once knew about the intimate connections between kinship and human 
community.”). 
 203 FEDERMAN, supra note 60, at 68–69. 
 204 See, e.g., COREY, supra note 61, at 110 (“Owner and chef Jon Kaber says he is most proud of his 
grandmother’s chilled beet recipe.”); FEDERMAN, supra note 60, at xi–xii (“This is our yichis, the hard work 
and the satisfaction of selling herring: of getting the fish into the store each morning, of arranging the displays 
hundreds of times each day, of customers buying and counter-men selling, and, it is to be hoped, of making a 
profit in the process.” (emphasis omitted)); Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, Family Businesses and the 
Business of Families: A Consideration of the Role of the Lawyer, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 158 (1998) 
(“Socially and culturally, the family business offers the opportunity to unify work and family concerns for the 
benefit of succeeding generations.” (quoting DAVID BORK, FAMILY BUSINESS, RISKY BUSINESS: HOW TO 
MAKE IT WORK (1986))). 
 205 BELLOW, supra note 57, at 472. 
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Put more formally, family businesses can create “generation-spanning 
continuities in the sociostructural position of families.”206 In this regard, the 
family business “can play a symbolic, identity-creating role.”207 
For a thoughtful exploration of one family’s identification with a business 
enterprise, consider Jiro Dreams of Sushi, a recent documentary film 
concerning a master chef, Jiro Ono, who trained his eldest son to take over his 
renowned Tokyo sushi restaurant.208 At the time of filming, Jiro’s son was in 
his 50s, had long since completed his apprenticeship, and stood ready to carry 
on the family legacy.209 No one else had the requisite qualifications for the role 
at a restaurant so exacting that chefs must apprentice for years before they are 
entrusted to prepare the tamagoyaki egg omelet.210 
Inherited resources are also “a material foundation for family continuity” 
and “even for the middle class, transfers of wealth provide at least a partial 
buffer against the vagaries of the marketplace.”211 Additionally, a family 
business can help achieve a “family’s goal of keeping the family located within 
close proximity of one another to accommodate their family values, one of 
which involves spending quality time together.”212 In a national economy that 
frequently requires family members to relocate, these are not trivial benefits. 
Over time, a family business can create opportunities for children to 
succeed in the broader economy and not just as business heirs. As one 
third-generation owner explained regarding his early education in the business, 
At the time, I had no intention of growing up to be a fishmonger, nor, 
I’m equally sure, would my father have wanted me to “take over the 
business.” The plan was for me to go to college and become a 
 
 206 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 18 (Thomas Dunlap trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2008) (2004); 
BELLOW, supra note 57, at 472 (“The more such generational transactions there are, the healthier for society as 
a whole.”). 
 207 BECKERT, supra note 206, at 19 (discussing inheritances). 
 208 JIRO DREAMS OF SUSHI (Preferred Content 2011). For a review of the film, see Roger Ebert, Jiro 
Dreams of Sushi, ROGEREBERT.COM (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/jiro-dreams-of-sushi-
2012. For a synopsis of the film, see Jiro Dreams of Sushi, CURIOUS FILM DISTRIBUTION, 
http://www.curiousdistribution.com/media/11154/jiro_final_curious.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 209 JIRO DREAMS OF SUSHI, supra note 208. 
 210 Id. Other employees, including a younger son, completed their apprenticeships and then opened 
restaurants elsewhere. Id. 
 211 BECKERT, supra note 206, at 18. Thus family wealth “allows a better education, a higher risk 
tolerance, and improved living conditions.” Id. 
 212 Bridgette K. Mulder, A Model of Organizational Nepotism, in NEPOTISM IN ORGANIZATIONS 219, 231 
(Robert G. Jones ed., 2012) (noting as well that “an offer of nepotism” may not be forthcoming if the position 
would require the family member “to travel a great deal or live significant distances apart for the job”). 
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professional; that was the unstated but clearly understood trajectory 
for most Jewish boys growing up in the 1950s.213 
The multi-generational continuity of family ownership in some industries 
may, therefore, reflect family pride and heritage rather than a lack of other 
options or the locking up of economic advantage.214 The prevalence of family 
ownership (and ethnic association) even in countries, like the U.S., with robust 
economic and legal institutions that support business dealings among strangers 
indicates the “resilience of informal, personalized exchanges and in-group 
preferences.”215 
2. Strengthening Communities 
When family members work together on a daily basis, combining business 
and family values, they not only strengthen the family but may also make 
lasting contributions to their communities.216 Family business can provide an 
anchor for widening circles of concern and responsibility. For example, by 
recognizing the connection between paid work and family life, family 
businesses may consciously include the families of employees who are not 
related to the owners.217 As one family business owner explained, “[W]e’re not 
just a family business in that we’re family owned. We know and appreciate the 
needs of our employees and their families so we want to make sure we succeed 
for them as well.”218 
 
 213 FEDERMAN, supra note 60, at 62. 
 214 Cf. Malcolm, supra note 58 (reporting that the Argosy bookstore owners “are proud of their success in 
carrying on the family business and aware of the mystique that attaches to the old-book trade. Children who 
inherit slaughterhouses or factories that manufacture incontinence products may not feel as blessed”). 
 215 Cao, Diaspora, supra note 88, at 1563. 
 216 See, e.g., Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8, at 1190–91 (“[B]usiness ownership can provide 
nonmonetary benefits to family members such as stable employment, status in the community, and agreeable 
working conditions.”); Lizette Alvarez, After 128 Years of Rolling Them, Tampa Is Close to No Cigars, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/22/us/after-150-years-of-rolling-them-tampa-is-
close-to-no-cigars.html (reporting on the J. C. Newman Cigar Company, currently owned by the grandsons of 
the founder, and notable as the last cigar manufacturing factory remaining in the Tampa area after a “tide of 
owners . . . moved to the Caribbean and Central America”). 
 217 See Teresa J. Rothausen, Management Work–Family Research and Work–Family Fit: Implications for 
Building Family Capital in Family Business, 22 FAM. BUS. REV. 220, 226 (2009) (“If [family] leaders include 
employees’ families as well as their own families as members of the system, family businesses have the 
potential to play a prominent role in the policy arena on work–family in business.”). 
 218 Annie Pilon, From Humble Beginnings in a Garage, Family Business Thrives for 60 Years, SMALL 
BUS. TRENDS (Aug. 29, 2015, 12:30 PM), http://smallbiztrends.com/2015/08/family-business-through-
generations.html (quoting Joshua Kahn, Executive Vice President of Perfection Spring & Stamping Corp.). 
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These connections are especially important when the community is tested 
by hardship: “When business owners live in the same community as their 
customers, they have a deeper stake in the success of disaster recovery and the 
ability to influence not only the economic aspects of recovery but also the 
social connections that determine a community’s overall resilience—its 
spirit.”219 In this regard, family businesses “exhibit much care about continuity, 
community and connection: specifically, about the long term preservation and 
nurturing of their business and its markets, the fostering of talent and effective 
deployment of employees, and an emphasis on growing and sustaining 
relationships with clients.”220 
During a speech accepting his party’s nomination, President Obama lauded  
a family business in Warroad, Minnesota, that didn’t lay off a single 
one of their 4,000 employees when the recession hit even when their 
competitors shut down dozens of plants, even when it meant the 
owner gave up some perks and some pay because they understood 
that their biggest asset was the community and the workers who had 
helped build that business.221 
Although an anecdote does not establish that family businesses are more 
likely to exhibit socially responsible behavior, the business cited by President 
Obama illustrates how family values could be extended to employees and 
communities. 
In a similar vein, consider the Wisconsin Historical Society’s book jacket 
description for a recent photography book about family-owned businesses in 
Wisconsin: 
The businesses portrayed here—bakeries and barbecue joints, funeral 
homes and furniture builders, cheesemakers, fishermen, ferry boat 
drivers—have survived against all the odds, weathering tough 
economic times and big-business competition. The owners are loyal 
to their employees, their families, and themselves. And they are 
integral to their local economies and social fabric. The services and 
goods they provide are usually for neighbors and friends: generations 
 
 219 Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, After the Storm: The Vulnerability and Resilience of Locally Owned 
Business, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 95, 97 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013). The authors contend that “business entities, especially 
those that are locally owned, are both susceptible to harm and capable of resilience—and, in both dimensions, 
linked economically and socially to a broader community.” Id. at 96. 
 220 Miller et al., supra note 137, at 73. 
 221 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Acceptance Speech at the Democratic National Convention (Sept. 6, 
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/06/160713941/transcript-president-obamas-convention-speech#. 
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serve generations, creating lasting relationships and strong, vibrant 
neighborhoods and rural communities.222 
When family businesses successfully combine family and community 
values with a for-profit model, they can benefit a broader group of 
stakeholders. 
B. Dysfunction, Discrimination, and Parochial Values 
Unfortunately, when families own and operate businesses, family 
pathologies can adversely impact the lives of many other people who depend 
on those businesses. Family relationships are not invulnerable, and the overlap 
of business and family concerns can prove enormously destructive both to 
family interests and other stakeholders.223 Business problems poison family 
relationships, and unhealthy family dynamics infect the business.224 It is not 
uncommon for putative heirs to war for control, wreaking havoc along the 
way.225 Sometimes, family disputes can be settled without permanently 
damaging the business asset.226 Often, though, a family business will not 
survive the infighting. Thus, the destructive downside of family-business 
ownership should be considered when evaluating the overall role of family 
business in society.227 
 
 222 COREY, supra note 61 (book jacket). 
 223 See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 2:2 (rev. 2d ed. 2012) (noting that “business relationships 
often overlap family relationships so that a squeeze often reflects dysfunctional family relations or is 
exacerbated by family relations”). 
 224 See Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8, at 1191–92 (noting that “[i]n a crisis, the close emotional 
bonds that once supported a family business can become obstacles to rational action”). 
 225 See Roxanne Roberts, The Darcars Family Drama: Passed Over at Auto Business, A Daughter Sues, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-good-daughter-tammy-
darvish-and-the-darcars-family-drama/2015/04/01/70bb0834-d158-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html. 
 226 For example, the New Orleans landmark restaurant Brennan’s nearly collapsed as a result of family 
dissension. See Michael Kunzelman, Brennan’s Family Squabble over New Orleans Eatery Scheduled for 
Court on Monday, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 12, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/05/ 
brennans_family_squabble_sched.html (reporting that one shareholder meeting was so contentious that the 
police were called to restore order). Eventually, one side of the family acceded to a buyout proposal. See Pete 
Wells, Brennan’s in New Orleans Walks the Tightrope of Tradition, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/21/dining/brennans-in-new-orleans-walks-the-tightrope-of-tradition.html. 
 227 One might argue that the consequences of family-business disputes, when they arise, outweigh the 
many social contributions of healthier family businesses. The force of this objection would turn on empirical 
evidence regarding the prevalence of family disputes. The fact that family firms rarely survive a third 
generation of family ownership does not establish that business failures were caused by distinctively family 
troubles. First, a family firm may choose to sell to a competitor or outside ownership group, not as a mark of 
failure but as a means for unlocking value. Also, in a competitive market economy, a family-business failure 
does not require a special explanation. Businesses may fail to innovate or may fall victim to broader forces 
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Also, for a society stratified along lines of race and class, the insular hiring 
practices of family firms are of particular concern because they can cement 
existing disparities in opportunity.228 African Americans who are not 
considered for employment, let alone managerial responsibility in family 
businesses, often lack comparable avenues for success because of “low rates of 
black entrepreneurship.”229 The entrepreneurship gap, in turn, can be explained 
in part by poor credit traceable to segregated housing patterns,230 to say 
nothing of the lasting effects of slavery and de jure discrimination.231 Past 
discrimination continues to matter because “[b]usiness startups depend heavily 
on personal and family wealth, which is leveraged into lines of credit.”232 If 
background conditions of inequality limit entrepreneurial opportunities, then, 
in the aggregate, the insular practices of family businesses might exacerbate 
racial division and inequality. 
 
beyond their control. See Isabell Stamm & Christina Lubinski, Crossroads of Family Business Research and 
Firm Demography—A Critical Assessment of Family Business Survival Rates, 2 J. FAM. BUS. STRATEGY 117, 
118, 124 (2011) (arguing that assumptions regarding the relatively short lifecycle of family firms have not 
been adequately examined). 
 228 See Jaskiewicz et al., supra note 9, at 121 (noting that “since nepotism discriminates against 
non-family members, it has been characterized as detrimental to society”).  
 229 Anderson, supra note 90, at 1203; see also MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS S. SHAPIRO, BLACK 
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 4 (2006) (noting “relatively low level 
of entrepreneurship”). 
 230 See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 107, 137–38 (2013) (“Residential segregation dampens wealth growth among African American 
homeowners by ‘suppressing their home equity’ but has the opposite effect on white homeowners.” (quoting 
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES 
INEQUALITY 121 (2004))); Anderson, supra note 90, at 1203 (“Because blacks are confined to less-desired 
neighborhoods, on average the value of their housing grows less than that of whites.”); see also Michael A. 
Fletcher, A Shattered Foundation: African Americans Who Bought Homes in Prince George’s Have Watched 
Their Wealth Vanish, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/ 
2015/01/24/the-american-dream-shatters-in-prince-georges-county/ (“Regardless of geography, if you own a 
home in a majority–minority neighborhood, you are going to get less value out of it than if you own a home in 
a homogeneous white neighborhood.” (quoting Dorothy A. Brown, associate vice provost and law professor at 
Emory University)). 
 231 See Fletcher, supra note 230 (“The economic deck has been stacked against African Americans from 
the start. The vast majority of blacks emerged from slavery with no money. New Deal worker protections, 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set a minimum wage, to Social Security, initially excluded the many 
African Americans who then labored as domestic workers and tenant farmers. The Federal Housing 
Administration’s loan policies excluded many of them from the homeownership deals that allowed many 
whites to move to the suburbs, helping them create wealth. Similarly, most African Americans were excluded 
from the GI Bill benefits that followed World War II.”). 
 232 Anderson, supra note 90, at 1203–04 (“Residential segregation, by depressing housing appreciation 
and reducing access to credit, therefore depresses black business startups, upon which black communities 
disproportionately rely.”). 
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Moreover, the influence of “nonmarket” values in the workplace is not 
necessarily something to celebrate.233 As noted earlier, businesses like Hobby 
Lobby may seek exemptions from generally applicable laws based on the 
religious convictions of their controlling shareholders. Yet, the religious values 
espoused by business owners can conflict with the interest of their employees 
in access to reproductive healthcare, or, conceivably, of customers in access to 
goods and services regardless of their gender, race, or sexual orientation.234 
Even if business owners do not seek or obtain exemptions from otherwise 
applicable laws, the owners nevertheless have wide discretion to run their 
businesses in a manner consistent with their values. In doing so, they may 
intend to benefit their employees and other stakeholders by including them 
within the compass of the family’s own values. For example, Hobby Lobby’s 
mission statement of core values includes, among other things, “[s]erving our 
employees and their families by establishing a work environment and company 
policies that build character, strengthen individuals, and nurture families.”235 
However, when wealth empowers business owners to inscribe their values into 
the structure of the marketplace, requiring others to abide by values they may 
not share, the confluence of economic and social power exacerbates the 
problem of wealth inequality.236 
On the other hand, so long as there are multiple businesses in the 
marketplace, and employees and customers are not forced to deal with a single 
player, there ought to be room for businesses to represent a variety of social 
views. In order to achieve a wider economic equality, it is important to ensure 
that the marketplace is open to everyone. Excluding religious individuals 
whose personal values conflict with society’s values would coerce a choice 
between deeply held principles and access to economic opportunities. 
Recognizing this trade-off does not require us to condone invidious 
discrimination, or to agree with the Supreme Court that Hobby Lobby need not 
 
 233 See generally Means, Nonmarket Values, supra note 8 (distinguishing market and nonmarket values in 
the context of family businesses). 
 234 Two state courts recently rejected claims by small-business owners that they were entitled to refuse to 
provide services for same-sex weddings based on religious objections. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 WL 4760453, at *8 (Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015); Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60–64 (N.M. 2013). 
 235 Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story (last visited Aug. 29, 
2015). 
 236 See Purdy, supra note 187 (manuscript at 1) (observing that wealth inequality relates to “the 
conception of citizenship implied in any picture of democracy: what it means to have standing in the political 
community and among other private individuals, and how wealth structures these relations”). 
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follow federal law regarding worker healthcare coverage.237 Nevertheless, if 
the goal is to widen economic opportunities, the laws regulating access to the 
marketplace should find ways to accommodate even those whose values depart 
dramatically from accepted mainstream principles.238 
IV. LESSONS FROM MARKET BASKET 
While no single case study can represent the wide variety of family 
businesses, a recent dispute concerning the Market Basket supermarket chain 
illustrates some of the benefits and the perils of family ownership. Market 
Basket’s experience shows that it is possible for family values to migrate over 
to the business side, supporting profitability while also taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders. But Market Basket also illustrates how family 
businesses can be destroyed by conflicts rooted in family grievances, and how 
employees, suppliers, and customers may all be caught in the crossfire. 
In 1917, Arthur and Efrasine Demoulas opened a grocery store in Lowell, 
Massachusetts.239 In time, they sold the business to their sons, George and 
Telemachus,240 and the single grocery store eventually became a chain “with 
71 stores and 25,000 employees across Massachusetts, Maine, and New 
Hampshire.”241 However, soon after George’s death in 1971, relations between 
the two sides of the family broke down over allegations that Telemachus had 
used his control to siphon assets and deprive George’s heirs of an equal stake 
in the business.242 Litigation dragged on for almost a decade.243 
 
 237 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–79 (2014) (holding that the 
contraceptive coverage mandated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act infringed upon the 
religious interests of Hobby Lobby under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). For a defense of the Court’s 
holding, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 181, at 31. 
 238 The tension between accommodating and regulating the distinctive values advanced by particular 
family businesses seems to implicate Robert Cover’s identification of “nomic” communities. See Robert M. 
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1983) 
(arguing that “private lawmaking takes place through religious authority, contract, property, and corporate 
law . . . [and] also that from time to time various groups use these . . . devices to create an entire nomos—an 
integrated world of obligation and reality from which the rest of the world is perceived”). The 
“norm-generating autonomy” of nomic communities can provide the “the germ of meanings alternative to 
those of the power wielders.” Id. at 32, 62. Professor Cover concludes, “We ought to stop circumscribing the 
nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.” Id. at 68. 
 239 See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 165 (Mass. 1997). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Evan Horowitz, The Saga of Demoulas’ Market Basket, BOS. GLOBE (July 15, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/07/14/the-saga-demoulas-market-basket/S1D7gi92dqfJYZzr9 
FIBCJ/story.html. 
 242 See Demoulas, 677 N.E.2d at 165–66. 
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Conflict flared anew this past year because a family member who had 
aligned herself with the heirs of Telemachus shifted her vote, giving Arthur S. 
Demoulas (son of George) and his side of the family the majority needed to 
remove his cousin Arthur T. Demoulas (son of Telemachus) from his position 
as CEO.244 According to some news accounts, the Arthur S. side of the 
Demoulas family wanted to make Market Basket more profitable, disapproved 
of overly generous wages and benefits, and was concerned about self-dealing 
transactions between Market Basket and entities controlled by Arthur T. or his 
family.245 In response, Market Basket’s employees and customers staged a 
highly vocal protest, involving “work slowdowns, protests, and boycotts,” in 
order to convince the board to retain Arthur T. as CEO.246 
Public pressure delayed247 but did not prevent Arthur T.’s removal, which 
created further turmoil threatening the company’s survival.248 As the dispute 
dragged on, Market Basket’s revenues dropped precipitously and the 
company’s struggles impacted employees, distributors, suppliers, and 
customers.249 The dispute may have “cost the Demoulas family as much as $10 
million per day while the stores remained closed or disrupted.”250 In the end, 
Arthur T. was able to buy out the other side of the family and to assume full 
 
 243 Id. at 159, 166. 
 244 See Horowitz, supra note 241.  
 245 See Casey Ross, Legal Memos Trace Acrimony Between Demoulas Factions, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 2, 
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/08/01/legal-memos-trace-acrimony-between-demoulas-
factions-over-real-estate-deals/FPXxU0sANyOcyzmpzjISmO/story.html. 
 246 See Ben Mathis-Lilley, New England Supermarket Employees, Customers (!) Take Sides in Corporate 
Power Struggle, SLATE (July 28, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/07/28/ 
market_basket_empty_shelves_in_beantown.html. 
 247 See Casey Ross, Market Basket CEO Gets Reprieve, BOS. GLOBE (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2013/07/18/marketbasket/qKpk8JGaLsmUmLwJ0oItHL/story.html. 
 248 See Callum Borchers, Constant Challenges, No Certainties for New CEOs at Market Basket, BOS. 
GLOBE (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/08/05/constant-challenges-certainties-for-
new-ceos-market-basket/TLtsq6IQ7sUMMW3abHO1VJ/story.html (“As the Demoulas family supermarket 
spectacle drags through a fourth week, Gooch and Thornton, who were appointed in June, are trying to return 
Market Basket’s 71 stores to normal operations while ownership of the company hangs in limbo, shelves are 
bare, and thousands of workers continue their crusade to bring back the ousted president, Arthur T. 
Demoulas.”). 
 249 Editorial, Market Basket’s Only Solution Is to Bring Back Arthur T. Demoulas, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 7, 
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/08/06/market-basket-only-solution-bring-back-
arthur-demoulas/fT2g89pXs8eOGsCI9zioLK/story.html (“The family feud that led to Arthur T. Demoulas’s 
dismissal may make for fascinating theater, but it’s time to bring down the curtain. The showdown threatens to 
destroy thousands of jobs, a great local brand, and a community asset with it.”). 
 250 Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 303 
(2015). 
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control over the business.251 The business appears to have recovered from the 
disruption; it has opened several new branches and “on pace to do nearly $5 
billion in sales this year, according to company officials.”252 
Whatever the merits of the dispute among the Demoulas family members, 
the business has thrived under Arthur T.’s leadership, and he appears to have 
adhered to a set of values associated with family ownership: “Family 
businesses are closely knit, with an integrated structure that makes employees 
feel as though they’re not just numbers.”253 Despite Market Basket’s size, 
Arthur T. carefully maintained the ethos of family in his stewardship of the 
business: “[E]mployees have said he remembers their family members’ names 
and has helped those who need it.”254 Without losing sight of the need to earn a 
profit, it appears that Market Basket’s business practices have been as 
enlightened as any advocate for corporate social responsibility could hope—it 
treats its employees (known as “associates”) fairly, sets its prices lower than 
would maximize profits, not just to build its brand but also to be a responsible 
member of the community.255 Market Basket has also been entrepreneurial in 
its efforts to put stores in underserved, poorer neighborhoods.256 
Perhaps overstating his case, one reporter compared Arthur T. to a 
benevolent character in a Charles Dickens novel: 
Artie T. Demoulas is a modern-day Fezziwig, the big-hearted 
warehouse owner in Dickens’s “A Christmas Carol.” Fezziwig was a 
 
 251 See Kevin Cullen, A Way of Life Prevails in Market Basket Saga, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 31, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/08/30/balancing-business-with-way-life/mkibZrZmz3FdiI2ROD 
58oI/story.html. 
 252 Moroney, supra note 197; Adam Vaccaro, A Year Later, Things Are Going Pretty Well for Market 
Basket, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 22, 2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.boston.com/business/news/2015/08/22/year-
later-things-are-going-pretty-well-for-market-basket/PqvTZ06w8W3yr4xvoZVNwL/story.html. 
 253 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PLAYING THEIR HAND: U.S. FAMILY BUSINESSES MAKE THEIR BID FOR 
THE FUTURE (2012–2013), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/publications/assets/pwc-
family-business-survey-us-report.pdf (quoting Robert Simon, CFO Contractors Steel Company). 
 254 Grant Welker, Sun Man of the Year Arthur T. Demoulas Puts Workers, Customers Ahead of Profits, 
LOWELLSUN.COM (Jan. 14, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_24907193/sun-man-year-
arthur-t-demoulas-puts-workers; see also Moore, supra note 104 (observing that while Arthur T. glanced at 
employee name tags, “nowhere does the Market Basket name tag say, ‘my daughter just went to college,’ or, 
‘my dad just died.’ Arthur T. knew details like these”). 
 255 Welker, supra note 254 (“My interest is in continuing the legacy of my father, T.A. Demoulas, who 
built Demoulas Super Markets into what it is today on the simple principles of respect, fairness, honesty and 
sharing.”). 
 256 That members of the Demoulas family appear to disagree about the value of these practices is a useful 
reminder that family ownership is no guarantee that a business will behave more ethically than a non-family 
business. At most, the identification of the business with the family and with family values may make it more 
likely that a business will operate responsibly and with concern for all its stakeholders. 
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capitalist, but he prided himself on not maximizing profits at the 
expense of his employees, or his own soul. When the man who 
eventually buys him out makes a bid, suggesting he’ll never get a 
better offer, Fezziwig’s response could be lifted right out of the 
Market Basket story: “It’s not just for money alone that one spends a 
lifetime building up a business,” Fezziwig says. “It’s to preserve a 
way of life that one knew and loved.”257 
Yet, even if Arthur T.’s public image has been shrewdly cultivated, it 
remains true that he has used his position as CEO to advocate for the interests 
of his employees, customers, and the communities in which the Market Basket 
stores operate.258 The sale of Market Basket to Arthur T. was remarkable 
because loyal employees and customers were prepared to destroy the company 
to prevent anyone else from running it.259 Had it been otherwise, a number of 
outside companies might have been able to outbid Arthur T. because they saw 
opportunities to increase revenue by operating Market Basket along more 
traditional lines.260 
Although Arthur T.’s grandiloquent gestures made him literally 
irreplaceable, Market Basket’s shareholders ultimately bear the cost of 
foregone profits. Reportedly, Market Basket’s governance crisis arose in part 
because some Demoulas family shareholders were unhappy with Market 
Basket’s failure to focus on profitability, complaining for instance that Arthur 
T. “unilaterally rolled out a 4 percent discount on goods within the store late 
last year, arguing that customers could use the money more than his fellow 
shareholders.”261 However, even from a profit-maximizing perspective, one 
might hesitate to critique a management philosophy that can generate annual 
sales of $4.6 billion while creating a loyal workforce and customer base. 
 
 257 Cullen, supra note 251. 
 258 See, e.g., Welker, supra note 254.  
 259 See Mathis-Lilley, supra note 246. 
 260 See Katharine Q. Seelye & Michael J. de la Merced, Grocery Chain Reels as Employees and 
Customers Rally for an Ousted President, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/us/ 
grocery-chain-reels-as-employees-and-customers-rally-for-an-ousted-president.html (“Some prospective 
bidders have said that they could squeeze more profits out of the company, since management under Arthur T. 
Demoulas has shown little inclination to maximize profitability.”). 
 261 Id.; cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 670–71 (Mich. 1919) (involving allegations that 
Henry Ford improperly withheld dividends from shareholders). In a pre-trial interview, Henry Ford stated, “I 
do not believe that we should make such an awful profit on our cars. A reasonable profit is right, but not too 
much.” M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old Is New Again, in 
CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 61 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). Although Ford lost the case, commentators 
have noted that this was also brilliant public relations. See id. at 1–2, 14.  
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As Market Basket illustrates, family businesses are distinctive in ways that 
can provide wider benefits, even though dependence upon family stability also 
has risks.262 Scholars will no doubt continue to investigate the factors that 
promote healthy family-business enterprise, as well as the factors that can 
signal trouble.263 The point for present purposes is that concerns about 
concentrated wealth and inequality should not cause us to caricature the 
contributions of family business or to ignore the disruption that would ensue if 
fortunes were fragmented each generation. Any form of business that can, on a 
good day, bring together owners, employees, customers, and other stakeholders 
has something of value to teach us. 
CONCLUSION 
How can we create a meaningful equality of opportunity, while, at the same 
time, insisting upon individual freedom—including the prerogative of parents 
to use all available resources to give their children advantages in life? By their 
nature, families perpetuate inequality; children who come from wealth and 
privilege inherit advantages that threaten to make a mockery of equal 
opportunity. Accordingly, some commentators argue that we should curtail 
economic inheritances, and that the children of the wealthy should, at the very 
least, be required to earn their own fortunes. From this perspective, family 
businesses look like bastions of unearned privilege. Family heirs benefit not 
only from inherited wealth but also from access to employment opportunities 
reserved for them. 
Yet, this Article has argued that family businesses can also serve as ladders 
of opportunity when society fails to invest adequately in social mobility. Just 
as affirmative action programs may reduce inequality by resisting a legacy of 
racial and gender discrimination, the kinship preferences that are characteristic 
of family businesses can create pathways to success for immigrants and other 
groups that are shut out of the existing social structure. Moreover, to the extent 
 
 262 Even during the period of apparent quiet preceding the latest legal battle for control, Market Basket 
board meetings were far from cordial: “Arthur S. and the board member appointees from his side of the family 
continually challenged Arthur T.’s authority to enter into sizeable real estate transactions without approval 
from the board, and were generally fearful and distrustful that the Arthur S. side of the family was being taken 
advantage of.” Blair, supra note 250, at 335. 
 263 In this regard, legal scholars have begun to focus on the legal architecture that would best support 
family businesses. See Means, Contractual Foundation, supra note 8, at 731 (arguing that “family-business 
law should offer a resource—a set of principles that credit the parties’ negotiated bargain in full context that 
also compensate for what family members cannot anticipate or adequately address regarding their business 
venture”). 
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family values temper a focus on profitability with a sense of social 
responsibility, family businesses can contribute to the effort to build and 
sustain a more equal society. 
In sum, family businesses should be evaluated in the context of a society 
that is already, and for other reasons, characterized by tremendous inequality. 
Wealth inequality is a problem that implicates the state, the family, and the 
market. A comprehensive response to wealth inequality must involve all three 
institutions. By compensating for state inaction and by tempering the harshest 
edges of the market, family businesses have the potential to play an important 
role in ameliorating inequality. 
